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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND CONTROL ON 
DIVISION RISK-TAKING STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE
Hae Ryong Kim 
Old Dominion University. 1998 
Director: Dr. Kae H. Chung
This research explored two major functions o f corporate strategic management, 
corporate diversification (core-business relatedness) and corporate control, and their 
implications for divisional strategic management. Four research questions were raised to 
address these issues: (1) does core-business relatedness matter to division performance? 
(2) how does core-business relatedness influence corporate control? (3) how does core- 
business relatedness influence division risk-taking strategies and performance? and (4) 
how does corporate control influence division risk-taking strategies and performance?
Adopting the resource-based view and organizational learning theory, this study 
proposed that core-business related divisions would outperform unrelated divisions and 
that core-business related divisions would have higher commitment to risk-taking 
strategies than would unrelated divisions. From a strategic management perspective, it 
was hypothesized that corporate control would be differentiated by core-business 
relatedness. Viewing the relationship between a corporate office and its divisions from 
an agency theoretical perspective, this study suggested that corporate control would 
influence division risk-taking strategy. Finally, from a strategic management perspective.
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this study proposed the moderating effects o f  core-business relatedness and corporate 
control on the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance.
Korean business groups were selected as samples because they provided objective 
divisional performance data. Data was collected from 57 affiliated companies o f 32 
Korean business groups. Two indicators o f  risk-taking strategy were used to test the 
hypotheses: R&D investment and internationalization. T-test. analysis o f  variance, 
analysis o f  covariance, and multiple regression analysis were used to test the hypotheses.
The results show that core-business relatedness positively influences division 
performance. Core-business relatedness was found to positively affect divisional R&D 
investment but not divisional internationalization. Corporate control was found to be not 
differentiated by core-business relatedness. The moderating effect o f core-business 
relatedness on the relationship between division risk-taking strategies and performance 
was not found. The results show that decentralized corporate control positively 
influenced division R&D investment. In contrast, centralized corporate control positively 
influenced division internationalization. The moderating effect o f corporate control was 
not found.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Diversification has been an important strategic option for many firms in 
industrialized countries. Rumelt (1982) observed that by 1970 over two-thirds of the US 
Fortune 500 firms were highly diversified and other studies showed similar trends in 
European countries. Asian countries, and other industrial nations (Chang & Choi. 1988: 
Channon. 1973: Dyas & Thanheiser. 1976: Suzuki. 1985). It has been suggested that 
large firms first expand their operations geographically, then integrate vertically, and 
finally diversify their product offerings (Chandler. 1962; Rumelt. 1974). As firms* 
diversification strategies change, so do the structures and internal control systems 
reflecting the relationships between the corporate office and divisions (Chandler. 1962: 
Williamson. 1975).
In diversified corporations, corporate-level decisions are related to two major 
questions: in what businesses should the company invest its resources? and how should 
the corporate office influence and relate to the divisions under its control? (Goold. 
Campbell. & Alexander, 1994; Grant, 1996) The first corporate-level decision is 
concerned with issues related to diversification, acquisition, divestment, and the 
allocation o f resources between different businesses. These activities form a major part 
o f corporate strategic management but the roles and responsibilities o f corporate strategic 
management extend much further. Equally important is the administrative role of 
corporate management in formulating and implementing business strategy at the
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divisional level and in coordinating activities between the divisions of the company.
Most studies on diversified firms have addressed these two major issues (diversification 
and corporate control) jointly or independently (e.g.. Govindarajan. 1988: Porter. 1980: 
Rumelt. 1974).
Recognizing the importance of these two major functions o f corporate strategic 
management, the present research studies the effects o f  these two variables on the 
management o f divisions. More specifically, it explores the relationships among a 
division's relatedness or unrelatedness to the core business, corporate control type, 
division risk-taking strategy, and division performance. Core-business relatedness refers 
to the degree to which a division's business is related to a firm 's primary business. 
Corporate control type refers to the relationship in which a corporate office establishes 
with its divisions. These main constructs are conceptualized fully in Chapter 2. To 
achieve the research purpose, this research raises the following four questions:
1. Does relatedness to the core business matter to division performance?
2. How does core-business relatedness influence corporate control type?
3. How does core-business relatedness influence a division's risk-taking strategies and its 
performance?
4. How does corporate control type influence a division's risk-taking strategies and its 
performance?
The theoretical frameworks o f this study are based on several perspectives: the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
resource-based view (Barney. 1991: Wemerfelt. 1984). organizational learning (Argyris 
& Schon. 1978: Leavitt & March. 1988). agency theory (Eisenhardt. 1989). and strategic 
fit (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987: Gupta. 1987). The resource-based view and the 
organizational learning perspective have been adopted to explain the relationship between 
core-business relatedness and a division's activities and between core-business 
relatedness and a division's performance. Agency theory is adopted to explain the 
relationship between corporate offices and divisions. A strategic fit perspective is used to 
explain the relationship between core-business relatedness and corporate control type. It 
also explains the effect o f corporate control type and the effect of core-business 
relatedness on the relationship between a division's risk-taking strategies and its 
performance.
Previous Research 
Core-business Relatedness and Performance
As diversification has increasingly become a popular strategic option for many 
companies, so has interest in studying the relationship between diversification and 
performance. Since the seminal research of Rumelt (1974), a number o f studies have 
attempted to clarify the relationship between diversification and corporate performance 
(Bettis. 1981: Christensen & Montgomery. 1981; Dubofsky & Varadarajan. 1989: 
Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1991: Palepu. 1985: Varadarajan & Ramanujam. 1987). Despite 
a large volume o f research on the issue, the research findings on the effects o f  
diversification strategies on corporate performance continue to be fragmentary’ and
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controversial (Ramanujam & Varadarajan. 1989). The inconclusivity o f  these results is 
caused by possible spuriousness o f observed relationships resulting from the problems 
associated with the unit o f analysis and industry effects (Dess. Gupta. Hennart. & Hill. 
1995: Ramanujam & Varadarajan. 1989).
As for the unit o f analysis, most studies on diversification have typically focused 
on the corporate level when investigating the relationship o f diversification and 
performance (e.g.. Montgomery. 1985; Rumelt. 1974). Some researchers, however, 
assert that the proper unit o f analysis should be at the individual business unit or 
divisional level rather than at the corporation level (Dess et al.. 1995). If there is any 
value that can be created by a corporate diversification strategy, it is at the individual 
business level where its effect will be most apparent. For example, in a diversified firm, 
the value o f relatedness realized at some divisions can be offset by the financial problems 
o f divisions not related to its core business. In this case, the effect o f relatedness cannot 
be captured when measuring performance at the corporation level, although, in fact, there 
is an effect.
Porter (1987) notes that it is not a diversified firm but its business units that 
compete in the individual markets. Davis and his colleagues (1992) indicated that 
research on the relationship between relatedness and performance generally provide little 
understanding of strategy formulation and implementation issues within the context o f the 
business-level, product-market arena within which corporate business units compete. As 
a result, very little is known about the effect o f relatedness on performance o f business 
units or divisions.
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Regarding the issue o f industry effects, subsequent researchers have suggested 
that the superior profitability o f related constrained firms in Rumelt's (1974) study may 
have been a function o f industry membership, not a function o f  diversification strategy. 
These researchers point out that performance is particularly sensitive to industry 
conditions. For example. Christensen and Montgomery (1981) found that Rumelt's 
(1974) findings may be a reflection o f systematic industry' market structure differences 
across the diversification categories. Bettis and Hall (1982) indicated that the related- 
constrained diversification category found most profitable in Rumelt's (1974) study is 
predominated by one particular industry (pharmaceuticals). Rumelt (1982) found in his 
later work that the high profitability o f related constrained firms in his sample was due to 
industry effects. Despite the evidence of industry effects presented, many following 
researchers did not control for industry' effects when investigating the diversification- 
performance relationship (e.g., Amit & Livnat. 1988; Michel & Shaked. 1984). Dess and 
his colleagues (1995) and Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989) pointed out that the results 
o f the research that did not control the industry effects may be spurious and may 
contribute to the inconclusivity in research findings on the diversification-performance 
relationship.
Recognizing these two vital issues in previous empirical research, the present 
study considered relatedness from the perspective o f a division. By focusing on the 
divisional level, spuriousness from the unit o f analysis problem will be prevented. At the 
divisional level, the possible industry effects can be controlled by narrowly defined 
industry markets. Since a diversified firm participates in several businesses, defining
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industry at the divisional level makes it possible to capture the differences in industry 
conditions between individual businesses within a corporation. The study also focuses on 
the core-business relatedness o f divisions in the corporation. The concept o f core 
business has been emphasized in the studies o f corporate strategy (e.g.. Goold. Campbell. 
& Alexander. 1994). It is suggested that relatedness to the core business is a good 
direction for corporate restructuring (Goold & Luchs. 1993). Thus, the specific research 
question raised in this study would be whether divisions related to a firm 's core business 
outperform divisions not related to the core business. By providing insights at the 
divisional level, especially the core-business relatedness o f divisions, the current study 
expands the existing perspective on relatedness and advances our understanding o f the 
relationship between corporate diversification and performance.
Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control Type
The second major research question is concerned with the relationship between 
core-business relatedness and corporate control type. Strategy research on 
multidivisional companies has stressed the impact o f corporate diversification on 
organizational structure in terms of control type (e.g.. Hill & Hoskisson. 1987:
Hoskisson. 1987). The structures of large diversified firms have evolved from simple 
functional arrangement to multidivisional forms (Chandler. 1962: Rumelt. 1974). As a 
business firm grows by expanding its product lines or areas, it faces problems o f 
coordination and control. Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975. 1985) contend that the 
multidivisional structure is an innovative response to those problems. A multidivisional
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
organization consists o f  a separate corporate office and a number o f  operating divisions 
organized on the basis o f products, markets, geographic areas, or some combination of 
these dimensions. Today, the multidivisional structure appears to have become the 
dominant organizational arrangement for large diversified firms in developed nations 
(Chandler. 1962; Chang & Choi. 1988; Channon. 1973; Franko. 1974; Rumelt. 1974; 
Steer & Cable. 1978; Suzuki. 1985).
In response to the popularity o f corporate diversification, researchers have focused 
on the effects o f  corporate diversification on organizational structure. It has been 
suggested that a diversified firm can be managed to realize economies o f scope associated 
with related diversification or internal market economies associated with unrelated 
diversification (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Corporate-level managers in highly diversified 
firms—those with an unrelated diversification strategy—generally focus on the 
development and operation of an internal capital market that does not seek synergistic 
relationships among divisions (Dundas & Richardson. 1982). They generally have little 
first-hand knowledge o f industries or geographic regions in which their divisions compete 
and the technology that they use. Thus, for the purpose of allocating capital and 
incentives, they tend to focus attention almost exclusively on financial results and not on 
promoting operating synergies among the different businesses.
In contrast, dominant business firms and related-diversified firms focus on 
creating operating synergy stemming from economies o f scope and sharing organizational 
resources between business units or divisions (Teece, 1982). They emphasize resource 
sharing and employ incentives to improve overall firm performance. They also exercise
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
corporate control in order to seek operating synergies on the basis o f  operational 
knowledge o f the division's businesses. The emphasis on corporate control for synergies, 
resource sharing and incentives to improve overall firm performance leads to a longer- 
term performance.
Most research has attempted to distinguish one diversified firm from the other by 
the number o f segments in which the firm operates and the relative importance o f each 
segment to total firm sales (e.g.. Rumelt. 1974: Palepu. 1985). The diversified firm as a 
whole was the unit o f analysis in investigating the relationship between diversification 
strategy and control type in which a corporate office manages its divisions. Control type 
was considered from the perspective o f the corporate office. It has been thought o f as the 
relationship o f the corporate office with all o f its divisions.
However, the approach that researchers have taken can be justified only if all o f a 
firm 's divisions are managed with the same control system or if variances in the control 
system between divisions in a multidivisional firm are so small that they can be 
disregarded. Research on diversification and corporate control systems suggests that 
differentiated control approaches may be adopted across divisions within a firm (Goold & 
Campbell. 1987; Gupta. 1987; Hamermesh & White. 1984). They argued that 
differentiated control approaches improve corporate performance by realizing 
performance improvement opportunities that exist within divisions. The nature o f those 
opportunities varies from one business to another.
The adoption o f differentiated control approaches by the corporate office may be 
encouraged by a particular organizational structure. In firms with many divisions, a new
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
hierarchical layer called the 'sectoral executive' is often created to reduce the span of 
control of the corporate office (Galbraith & Kazanjian. 1986). In this minigroup system, 
the appropriate location for staff influence and decision making is likely to be the sector 
level rather than the corporate level. Also, this sectoral approach o f a corporation 
controlling its constituent divisions is likely to lead to differentiated control types for 
each o f the sectors. As a result, some variances in control approaches to first-line 
divisions within a firm can be easily observed from this kind o f divisional structure.
Considering the importance o f differentiated control approaches, the present study 
considers corporate control type from the perspective o f  the division. It focuses on the 
relationship between the corporate office and each individual division rather than on the 
relationship between a corporate office and all o f its divisions. The present study 
examines how core-business relatedness influences the control type o f a corporate office 
to its division.
Core-business Relatedness, Division Risk-taking Strategy, and Performance
Rumelt (1974) conjectured that related firms participate in industries 
characterized by opportunities for product differentiation and market segmentation.
Bettis (1981) found that related firms spent significantly more for advertising than did 
unrelated firms and that related firms were able to achieve higher returns for research and 
development. Although the interrelationship between relatedness and strategic activities 
was identified and speculated upon, very little is known about the reason why relatedness 
is pertinent to certain strategic activities such as research and development and how
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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relatedness influences the relationship between strategic activities and performance.
Since the unit o f analysis has been mainly the diversified firm as a whole, little has been 
known about the causal relationship among relatedness, strategic activities, and 
performance at the divisional level. The present study attempts to explain the 
relationship between relatedness, a division's risk-taking, and performance. The strategic 
fit perspective on synergy and the resource-based view focusing on firm-specific assets 
and skills give some insights into understanding how core-business relatedness influences 
a division's risk-taking strategy and performance.
Much of strategic management literature has stressed that an essential component 
o f corporate-level strategy is the maximization o f operating synergy as opposed to 
financial synergy among business units or divisions (Ansoff. 1965; Kanter. 1989; Porter. 
1985). Operating synergy is created when business units or divisions support and 
complement each other in their competitive efforts (Porter. 1980). Business units can 
capture operating synergies from areas with some common core skills or resources. 
Sharing resources and capabilities between divisions or business units on the basis o f 
common core factors enable them to accumulate firm-specific resources and skills 
(Porter. 1985; Rumelt. 1982).
Recently, firm-specific assets and capabilities have been emphasized in the 
resource-based view of the firm. This perspective characterizes the firm as a collection of 
unique skills and capabilities that influence the firm 's evolution and strategic growth 
(Barney. 1991; Wenerfelt. 1984). Researchers following this view suggest that a firm 's 
peculiar pattern o f assets (tangible and intangible) have important effects on its strategic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ability (Mahoney & Pandian. 1992). They also suggest that a unique set o f  resources and 
skills is nurtured and developed from collective learning in the organization (DiBella & 
Nevis. 1998: Prahalad & Hamel. 1990). Organizational learning becomes 
institutionalized over time and thus becomes part o f a firm 's knowledge creating system. 
It is suggested that environmental uncertainty is reduced because o f knowledge 
accumulated through the learning process (Lei. Hitt. & Bettis. 1996).
Based on the relationship between relatedness and firm-specific assets and skills 
suggested in prior studies, the present study asserts that divisions related to the core 
business show a more positive attitude toward risk than divisions unrelated to the core 
business. This is because firm-specific assets (tangible and intangible) are likely to help 
divisions discover new opportunities for product and process innovation. It is also 
because greater and diverse knowledge from collective learning reduces anxiety 
associated with environment uncertainty. This study further argues that divisions related 
to the core business are likely to be under a more favorable internal environment in 
implementing risk-taking strategies. The rationale is that the knowledge base formulated 
through collective learning improves a division's ability to obtain potential gains from its 
risk-taking strategies. Coordination activities between related divisions also improve 
their abilities in implementing risk-taking strategies by sharing resources and knowledge 
for strategic success. Specifically, this study focuses on the main effect o f core-business 
relatedness on a division's attitude toward risk and the moderating effect o f relatedness 
on the relationship between a division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. These 
issues will be discussed fully in the next chapter.
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Corporate Control, Division Risk-taking Strategy, and Performance
The last research question o f this study is concerned with the relationship among 
corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and division performance. Prior studies 
have developed a theory for understanding corporate control in terms o f its effects on a 
division's strategy (Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). This issue 
has attracted attention from investigators because it has been indicated that a firm 's risk 
taking influences its competitiveness in the domestic and international market and that 
risk taking may be associated with corporate diversification and corporate control 
systems (Leoscher. 1984; Young. 1985). Researchers have focused on the effects o f the 
multidivisional structure on the division's risk-taking strategies (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). 
Their arguments recognize the effects o f the multidivisional structure on division-level 
managers' decision-making horizons and their attitudes toward risk.
These studies suggest that division managers operating within a multidivisional 
form tend to avoid risky strategies and subsequently sacrifice long-term investments to 
more immediate financial performance goals (Burgelman. 1983: Dearden. 1969: Dundas 
& Richardson. 1982: Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Hill. Hitt & Hoskisson. 1988: Hill & 
Hoskisson. 1987; Jaeger & Baliga. 1985: Loescher. 1984: Norbum & Miller. 1981; 
Rapapport. 1978; Solomon. 1964; Stonich. 1981). The basic argument is that in large, 
diversified firms, corporate managers tend to use financial criteria for evaluating division 
managers' performance because they generally have little first-hand knowledge of the 
operating intricacies, technology, or geographic regions of the division (Dundas & 
Richardson. 1982). This encourages division managers to meet short-term financial
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
objectives by reducing expenditures that are not essential for the attainment of short-run 
returns even though these expenditures may be critical to long-term organizational 
performance. In short, division managers tend to avoid risk and to favor investments 
with predictable returns (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988: Jaeger & Baliga. 1985).
Focusing on the effects o f corporate control on division managers' decision­
making horizons and attitudes toward risk, prior research has investigated the 
relationships between corporate diversification, corporate control type, and a division's 
risk taking (Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). However, that prior 
research has several limitations. First, the attention o f previous research has been limited 
to the comparison of managers' attitudes toward risk between firms with a functional 
structure (U-form) and multidivisional structure (M-form). U-form firms are organized 
along functional lines. The principal operating units in the U-form firm are the functional 
divisions—sales. finance, manufacturing (Williamson. 1975). Prior studies share the basic 
argument that the differences in risk taking between two organization forms result from 
the differences in corporate control type used in organizations. The tight financial control 
associated with M-form structure results in an increased emphasis on short-term 
efficiency. This emphasis, in turn, leads to a division's preferences against risk taking. 
However, it has been argued that variations in corporate control type can be observed not 
only between U-form and M-form but also within various M-form firms (Hill. 1988: 
Lorsch & Allen. 1973: Markides & Williamson. 1996: Williamson. 1975).
For example. Williamson(1975) proposed a classification scheme that included 
five different forms of divisional structure: the holding company form, the
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multidivisional form, the transitional multidivisional form, the corrupted multidivisional 
form, and the mixed form. Agreeing to the existence o f several forms of divisional 
structure. Hill (1988) proposed three major types o f multidivisional structure according to 
the corporate control type adopted in divisionalized firms: 'pure M-form' or 'full M- 
form.' 'centralized M -form ' or 'corrupted M-form." and 'H -form .' Nevertheless, prior 
studies on the relationship o f corporate control type and a division's risk taking did not 
investigate the differences in a division's risk taking between M-form firms with different 
types o f corporate control.
Second, prior studies did not distinguish one divisional structure (pure M-form) 
from other divisional structures (centralized M-form and H-form) (Hoskisson. Hill. &
Kim. 1993). They used archival data or survey data from simple questions about physical 
organizational structure in classifying firms as the pure M-form or not. While the basic 
structural arrangement o f  a firm can generally be discerned from published material or 
from a categorical measure o f the physical organizational structure, the same cannot be 
said for the corporate control type involving the internal decision-making and control 
apparatus (Hill. 1988: Hoskisson et al.. 1993; Williamson. 1975). Therefore, the previous 
research might be exposed to a classification error, an overassignment to one type of 
divisional structure, the pure M-form. Consequently, their results might be contaminated 
by this methodological limitation.
Third, in prior studies, the unit o f analysis is the diversified firm as a whole.
Those studies analyzed the control approach at the corporate office level and measured its 
effect on a divisions' attitude toward risk at the diversified firm level rather than at the
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divisional level. As noted previously, differentiated control approaches may be adopted in 
multidivisional firms. Considering the importance o f using differentiated control 
approaches, this study points out that control type perceived at the division is appropriate 
for representing the relationship between the corporate office and a division. Thus, the 
relationship between corporate control and a division's attitudes toward risk should be 
explored at the divisional level. Corporate control measured at the corporate level may 
fail to reflect variances o f  control type across divisions within a diversified firm.
Fourth, also an important but underexplored issue is the impact o f corporate 
control on the relationship between a division's risk-taking strategies and its performance. 
In the strategic management literature, it has been argued that, for better performance, a 
division-level strategy must be implemented with the structural form and organizational 
processes consistent with the economic and competitive logic o f  that strategy (Hill & 
Hoskisson. 1987; Govindarajan & Fisher. 1990). On the basis o f this argument, many 
researchers have studied the impacts of internal decision-making and control systems on 
the relationship between a division's strategy and its performance (Golden. 1992; 
Govindarajan. 1986. 1988; Govindarajan & Gupta. 1985; Gupta. 1987; Gupta & 
Govindarajan. 1986). For example, Govindarajan (1988) found that emphasizing 
budgetary goals during performance assessment influences positively the effectiveness o f 
the division employing a low cost strategy but influences negatively the effectiveness o f 
the division pursuing a differentiation strategy. Gupta (1987) found that decentralization 
o f operating decisions gives a positive impact to a division's implementation o f the 
differentiation strategy. Given that the nature o f a firm 's risk-taking strategic behavior
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can significantly influence performance and that a division's strategy implementation 
may be influenced by the control system adopted by the corporate office, a theory for 
explaining the relationship between corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and 
division performance needs to be developed.
Recognizing the importance o f the aforementioned research issues, especially the 
underexplored relationships, coupled with the limitations o f prior studies, this study 
intends to examine the relationships among core-business relatedness, corporate control 
type, division risk-taking strategies, and division financial performance. The present 
study extends the previous research by developing a theoretical framework for explaining 
how corporate diversification influences divisions risk-taking strategy and performance 
and how corporate control type influences division risk-taking strategy and performance.
Research Site
Korean business groups are selected for this study for the following reasons.
First, they are large and highly diversified, allowing the study of the relationship between 
corporate office and its affiliated business units possible. Unlike U.S. conglomerates, 
which own affiliated companies, the business units affiliated with a Korean business 
group are legally independent and registered on the stock market separately. And yet. 
these affiliated companies are controlled by the corporate office for the purpose o f group 
level planning and coordination as if they are parts (or operating divisions) o f  a firm. The 
reason is that these affiliated companies are mostly owned and managed by the founder's 
family (Jung, 1987; Lee & Yoo, 1987; Ungson. Steers, & Park. 1997). Considering this
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characteristic, prior studies have considered the Korean business group as one large firm 
with a multidivisional structure (Chang & Choi. 1988: Cho. 1994: Jung. 1989; Kang. 
1990).
Second, in analyzing a Korean business group as a multidivisional structure, a 
division corresponds to an affiliated firm. Since affiliated firms are legally independent, 
publishing independent performance data, objective data on risk-taking strategies and 
financial performance can be obtained and used to test relevant hypotheses. In contrast, 
because in the U.S.. divisions are parts o f a diversified firm, objective performance data 
from divisions are not available. Such inaccessibility o f objective data from the 
divisional level is a major hindrance for studying divisional level strategic activities and 
performance in the U.S. (Gupta. 1987).
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized into four parts: theoretical development, research 
methods, results, and discussion. Chapter I introduces research questions and issues. 
Chapter II presents conceptual models, explains the expected relationships in the 
conceptual models, and presents the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter III presents 
research methods used to test the hypotheses. This chapter includes the study's sample 
and data, measurement, and data analytic techniques employed. Chapter IV reports 
empirical results. Lastly. Chapter V discusses the implications o f the findings on 
strategic management research and managerial implications for practitioners. The 
limitations o f this study and some directions for future research are also discussed.




The primary purpose of this chapter is to present theoretical linkages between 
constructs that are related to the research questions raised in Chapter I and to draw 
hypotheses to be tested. To this end. the chapter starts with conceptual models and 
constructs that provide the basis for developing the theoretical linkages. As noted in 
Chapter I. the present study is concerned with the influence o f core-business relatedness 
and corporate control type on a division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. Two 
sets o f theoretical linkages are advanced to answer the research questions. The first set 
deals with the concept o f core-business relatedness, its relationships with division 
performance, corporate control type, and risk-taking strategy, and its moderating effect on 
the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance. The second set 
deals with corporate control type, its relationships with division risk-taking strategy, and 
its moderating effect on the relationship between risk-taking strategy and performance. A 
set o f hypotheses is drawn from these theoretical linkages.
Conceptual Models and Constructs 
Conceptual Models
The conceptual models used to operationalize the research questions in the study 
are shown in Figure 2-1. Model A indicates the relationship between core-business 
relatedness and division performance. Model B presents the relationship between core-
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FIGURE 2-1 
C oaceptaal Model* of tke S tady
(A) Relationship between Core-business Relaiedness end Division Performance
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(B) Relationship between Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control Type
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Relatedness Control Type
(C) Relationship between Core-business Relatedness, Division Risk-taking Strategy and Performance
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(D) Relationship between Corporate Control Type , Division Risk-taking Strategy and Performance
Corporate 
Control Type
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FIGURE 2-1 (continued)







Division A  A ^  Division
Risk-taking Performance
Strategy
business relatedness and corporate control type. Model C shows how core-business 
relatedness influence a division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. Model D 
depicts the relationships among corporate control type, division risk-taking strategy, and 
division performance. Detailed explanations for these conceptual models will be 
presented in a later section that deals with theoretical linkages.
Although it is not the purpose o f this study to develop and test an integrative 
model, an attempt can be made to show plausible linkages among core-business 
relatedness, corporate control type, risk-taking behavior, and performance (see Model E). 
The present study develops and tests theoretical linkages between constructs by showing 
their statistical associations instead of developing and testing an integrative model. The 
main reason for this choice is that testing an integrative model requires unbiased path
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coefficients between all variables that are causes o f  an endogenous variable or are 
correlated with other endogenous variables (James. 1980). When key variables are 
omitted, it may lead to erroneous results (James & Singh. 1978). The difficulty o f 
including all relevant variables in testing an integrative model constitutes a main reason 
why we do not see much integrative research in strategic management literature, 
especially inter-level studies investigating the relationships between corporate and 
divisional levels (Dess et al.. 1995).
This study does not include all relevant variables that are causes o f endogenous 
variables. For example, business environment, industry growth stage, and top 
management's values can influence a firm 's risk-taking strategy but these variables are 
not included in the present study. Firms operating in uncertain environments are more 
likely to experiment with an innovative risk-taking strategy (Paine & Anderson. 1977).
An industry's growth stage can influence risk-taking strategy (Hambrick & Lei. 1985). 
Top managers' value systems also influence organizational risk-taking behaviors. 
Managers who value innovation are more likely to be more active in creating and 
utilizing an organization's innovative capacity (Cummings. 1965: Mohr. 1969: Pierce & 
Delbecq. 1977). Hage and Dewar (1973) demonstrated that the values o f managerial 
elites explain more o f the variance in innovation than any single structural dimension. 
Exclusion of these variables make the development and testing o f an integrated model 
problematic.
Why. then, are these variables not included in this study? The answer is that the 
development and testing o f an integrative model is beyond the scope o f this study. The
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purpose o f this study is to answer the four major research questions stated in Chapter I. 
which can be answered by testing the theoretical linkages associated with the four 
conceptual models. The findings o f this study, however, can provide some insights into 
the development of an integrative model by showing the direction o f critical linkages 
between key variables. The following section presents the major constructs used in the 
development o f conceptual models and related theoretical linkages.
Corporate Domain Constructs
In order to test the statistical associations between various constructs in the 
conceptual models, theoretical linkages between them need to be developed. Before such 
theoretical linkages are developed, we need to clearly define each o f the constructs used 
in the conceptual models. There are basically four major constructs that are used in the 
conceptual models: core-business relatedness, corporate control type, division risk-taking 
strategy, and division performance. The first two are related to the corporate domain: the 
last two are related to the divisional level.
Core-business Relatedness. Core business can be defined as one or a few 
industries in which a firm's core competencies or expertise are exploited (Goold et al..
1994). This broad definition raises a fundamental question. How can the core business 
be identified in multibusiness companies? In strategic management literature, the answer 
has been presented from two approaches. One approach focuses on the role o f the 
original business(es) in the process o f  business growth and diversification (e.g.. Chandler. 
1962; Collis & Montgomery. 1997). The other approach focuses on the present principal
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business(es) in single, dominant, or multibusiness companies (e.g.. Rumelt. 1974). For 
the purpose o f this study, core business is defined as the principal business! es) with a 
firm 's core competencies or expertise. It can be easily observed in firms with a single 
business or dominant business and to some extent in firms with related diversification. 
All or most o f  their business activities are conducted in relation to their primary 
industries. Core businesses can also be found in firms with unrelated diversification. 
Their businesses can be clustered around multiple core businesses, but the required 
accumulation o f knowledge and skills for each of these core businesses can be 
overwhelming. Core businesses o f  these firms can be identified by the relative 
importance o f  each individual business in the overall corporate business portfolio and by 
the accumulated knowledge about each business.
The concept o f core-business relatedness concentrates on the potential for creating 
synergies from sharing organizational activities and resources. Relatedness is defined by 
the degree to which business units or divisions support and/or complement each other's 
activities (Davis et al, 1992: Rumelt. 1974). Relatedness among divisions or business 
units basically comes from two sources: transferring skills or expertise and sharing 
resources and activities (Porter. 1987). Relatedness can be exploited in various value- 
chain activities, but production and marketing have been main targets for achieving 
synergies stemming from core-business relatedness (Ansoff. 1965: Davis et al. 1992: 
Porter. 1985: Rumelt. 1974).
Corporate Control Type. Control is defined as any process in which a person, 
group, or organization intentionally affects the behavior o f another person, group, or
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organization (Tannenbaum. 1968). In divisionalized organizations, a hierarchy of control 
can be seen at three levels: corporate, division, and functional. At the corporate level, 
control focuses on maintaining a balance among the various activities of divisions to 
achieve the corporate objectives. At the divisional level, control is primarily concerned 
with maintenance and improvement o f the division's competitive position. Lastly, at the 
functional level, the role o f control is to develop and enhance functionally-based 
distinctive competencies (Lorange. Morton. & Ghoshal. 1986).
In this study, corporate control type (corporate control hereafter) is defined by the 
relationship between the corporate office and its divisions (Hill. 1988). The relationship 
between a corporate office and its divisions has attracted some attention from strategy- 
structure theorists and organizational economists. Strategy-structure theorists reported 
that corporate diversification is associated with divisional structure (Chandler. 1962; 
Rumelt. 1974). high decentralization (Vancil. 1979). and performance-based incentive 
systems (Pitts. 1974). On the other hand, organizational economists focused on the 
internal decision-making and control apparatus for understanding the variances between 
divisionalized organizations (Williamson. 1975). More recently, there has been an effort 
to integrate these two approaches. Based on these two perspectives. Hill (1988) 
identified three main corporate control dimensions: strategic, financial, and operating.
- Strategic control: the term "strategic control" means different things to different 
people (Schreyogg & Steinmann. 1987). Some regard strategic control as activities 
designed to direct strategic plans and evaluate strategic results (Doz & Prahalad. 1981; 
Lorange et al., 1986), while others refer to it as a critical evaluation o f strategic domain.
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premise about internal and external environment, and the process o f strategy 
implementation, thereby providing information for future strategic action (Schrevogg & 
Steinmann. 1987). These definitions focus on the traditional review and feedback stage 
which constitutes the last step in the strategic management process.
In this study, strategic control is conceptualized differently from the general 
concept o f strategic control mentioned above. Borrowing from Hill's (1988) concept of 
corporate control, strategic control is considered as one o f the dimensions that is used to 
assess the corporate-division relationship. As a dimension of corporate control, strategic 
control deals with the basic strategic direction o f the division. It is through strategic 
control that the division develops a competitive strategy within parameters established by 
corporate-level strategists. Strategic control is basically concerned with the extent to 
which a corporate office defines the range and scope o f its divisions' strategic initiatives. 
For example, portfolio planning techniques are usually used by a corporate office o f the 
unrelated diversified company to evaluate the competitive positions o f subunits and 
resource allocation decisions (Hill, 1988). Divisions may differ in the range o f corporate 
control activities and in the degree of responsibility (or intervention) their corporate 
offices chooses to exercise.
- Financial control: financial control is control based upon financial return criteria 
(Ouchi. 1980). It involves setting clear financial targets for a business unit such as return 
on investment, profit margin, and growth rate. Financial control has been used 
interchangeably with market control in the literature (Hill. 1988). The nature o f financial 
control varies across divisionalized enterprises (e.g.. Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989;
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Goold & Campbell. 1987: Govindarajan. 1988; Gupta & Govindarajan. 1984: Hill & 
Hoskisson. 1987). Financial control contains two dimensions: the range of specific 
financial targets and the importance given to each financial target. The relationship o f the 
corporate office and divisions may be distinguished in terms o f the number o f specific 
financial targets applied to the division. The range can be defined as the absolute 
number o f functions which the corporate office uses for financial control. The second 
dimension of financial control is the degree to which the corporate office pushes the 
division to achieve financial targets. It is reflected by the level o f  emphasis that the 
corporate office imposes on specific financial targets.
- Operating control: the operating control dimension refers to the extent to which 
the corporate office is involved in the operations o f its divisions (Hill. 1988). The 
operations include such activities as marketing, manufacturing, and so forth. The range 
of possible functional areas controlled by the corporate office may vary across divisions 
in a corporation. Operating control contains two dimensions: range and degree. The 
relationship between the corporate office and the division may be distinguished in terms 
o f the range of operating control since some corporate offices seek control over certain 
functional activities while others can seek control over all functions. The range of 
operating control can be operationally defined as the absolute number o f operating 
activities in which the corporate office intervenes. The other dimension is the degree to 
which the corporate office circumscribes divisional discretion. It reflects the attention 
corporate offices gives to various operational activities.
- Configurations o f corporate control: Hill (1988) suggested that these control
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dimensions form configurations reflecting the internal decision-making and control 
systems. These configurations characterize the relationships between the corporate 
office and divisions. The corporate office can use any combination o f the three control 
dimensions to establish relationships with their divisions. The specific configuration 
depends on how multidivisional companies (M-form firms) differ in their internal 
decision-making and control systems (Williamson. 1975). For example, pure M-form 
firms are likely to use strategic and financial controls but allow divisions to exercise 
operational autonomy (Hill. 1988: Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Reflecting these differences 
in the configuration of the three control dimensions, three types o f corporate control can 
be identified: full, centralized, and laissez-faire (Hill. 1988). Table 2-1 summarizes the 
configuration o f three types of corporate control.
TABLE 2-1 




Full corporate control Decentralized Used extensively Used extensively
Centralized corporate 
control
Centralized Used moderately Used moderately
Laissez-faire corporate 
control
Decentralized Little used Little used
Adapted from Hill (1988). p.406.
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(1) Full corporate control: This control type can be characterized by an 
exclusive use o f financial and strategic controls and decentralization o f 
operational decision-making. Divisionalized firms characterized by this kind o f 
control type are classified as 'pure M-form firms' or 'competitive M-form firms' 
(Hill. 1988; Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Those firms are consistent with 
W illiamson's definition o f an M-form firm.
(2) Centralized corporate control: Under this control, corporate offices 
centralize operating decisions but exercise moderate financial and strategic 
controls. Firms adopting this type o f corporate control are classified as 
'centralized M-form firms' (Hill. 1988). "cooperative M-form firms' (Hoskisson 
et al.. 1993). or 'corrupted M-form firms' (Williamson. 1975).
(3) Laissez-faire corporate control: This control type is characterized by 
the corporate office-division relationship that is based upon decentralization o f 
operating decisions and a relatively minimal use o f financial and strategic 
controls. Divisionalized firms with this kind of control type are classified as 'H- 
form firms' (Hill. 1988; Williamson. 1975).
As indicated in Chapter I. within a multidivisional firm, a variety o f  corporate 
control types can be used simultaneously for different divisions. For example, full 
corporate control can be used with divisions which are not related to the core business of 
the firm, whereas centralized control can be used with divisions which are closely related 
with the firm 's core business. Williamson (1970. 1975) calls a divisionalized firm with
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multiple approaches o f corporate control an X-form firm. This differentiated approach to 
corporate control is essential to achieve organizational fits between diversification and 
corporate control even in the same organization.
Division-related Constructs
In order to assess the influences o f core-business relatedness and corporate 
control on the divisions o f a diversified firm, two constructs are presented in the 
conceptual models - division performance and risk-taking strategy. These two constructs 
are defined in this section.
Division Performance. For the purpose o f this study, division performance is 
defined as financial results at the divisional level. This definition reflects the dominance 
and legitimacy of the economic goals o f the firm. From a strategic management 
perspective, a firm 's performance consists o f two domains: financial and operational 
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam. 1986). Financial performance is typically expressed in 
terms o f sales growth, return on investment, stock price, and others, and it is the 
dominant concept in strategic management research (Hofer. 1983). Operational 
performance is assessed in terms o f market share, productivity, technological efficiency, 
and others.
Risk-taking Strategy. Risk refers to a potential deviation from expected outcomes 
(Arrow, 1971: Pratt, 1964). Risk-taking is then defined as the selection o f projects that 
have varying degrees o f uncertainty associated with their outcomes (Bromiley. 1991: 
Wright, Ferris, Sarin. & Awasthi. 1996). Based on these concepts o f risk and risk-taking.
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division risk-taking strategy is defined as activities that divisional managers undertake in 
light o f uncertainties associated with their strategic choices which may adversely affect 
their divisional performance. In prior studies, risk-taking strategies were operationalized 
in terms o f technological R&D expenditures (Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson. 
Hitt. & Hill. 1993). market research expenditures (Jaeger & Baliga. 1985). advertising 
spending (Lee. 1994). capital expenditures (Jaeger & Baliga. 1985). and 
internationalization (Broughthers. 1995: Shama. 1995).
Theoretical Linkages
In order to find theoretical linkages for the conceptual models, the following 
theoretical perspectives are employed. The resource-based view and organizational 
learning theory' are used to explain the relationship between core-business relatedness and 
division performance. Contingency theory (more specifically, strategic fit concept) is 
applied to find the linkage between core-business relatedness and corporate control. 
Agency theory explains the relationship between corporate control and division risk- 
taking strategy. A strategic fit perspective is used to gauge the effects o f core-business 
relatedness and corporate control on the relationship between division risk-taking 
strategy and performance. Based on these theoretical linkages, a set o f hypotheses are 
drawn.
Core-business Relatedness and Division Performance
The resource-based view and organizational learning theory are useful
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frameworks for explaining the relationship between core-business relatedness and 
performance. According to the resource-based view, a corporation is a collection o f 
resources and capabilities (Peteraf. 1993). Resources can be physical and financial 
tangible assets or intangible capacities to solve organizational and technological 
problems. Rare and valuable resources that are difficult to imitate give a firm “core 
competencies," with which the firm can successfully compete and perform (Barney.
1991; Prahalad & Hamel. 1990; Stalk. Evans. & Shulman. 1992). Core competencies 
enable the firm to create potentially idiosyncratic strategic growth (Lei et al. 1996; 
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990).
Organizational learning also adds to the firm 's core competencies. Core 
competencies o f the corporation can be built from organizational collective learning, by 
which a firm can accumulate specific assets, core skills, technologies, and other 
capabilities. For single or dominant business companies, collective learning centers on 
their primary businesses. In the multibusiness company, core competencies are achieved 
in the learning process involving the corporate office that collects and disseminates 
valuable knowledge and information. Core competencies can be built around a single 
business unit, but its capacity to accumulate the needed competency is rather limited in 
comparison with the corporate learning process, involving the corporate office and its 
core-business related divisions. In the corporate learning process, the central office plays 
the role o f  guardian and promoter o f the core competencies o f the corporation (Goold et 
al.. 1994). More importantly, the corporate office plays the role o f an organizational 
memory system which supports the whole process o f organizational collective learning.
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Research suggests that no learning can take place in an organization unless it possesses a 
proper memory system (Covington. 1981: Stein. 1989).
It is argued in the organizational learning literature that a knowledge base 
resulting from collective learning is a critical factor affecting the firm 's performance. 
Core competencies based on collective learning helps the firm understand the means o f 
achieving competitive success in its business environment. Accumulated knowledge and 
continuous learning can also help the firm reduce environmental uncertainty (Lei et al.. 
1996). Accumulated knowledge allows the firm to use its key capabilities to develop 
potential growth alternatives that lower the investment costs of expanding into new 
markets or developing related products (Hitt. Hoskisson. & Ireland. 1994: Teece. Rumelt. 
Dosi, & Winter, 1992). As a result, organizational learning may enable a firm to develop 
new products and markets. More importantly, core competence from collective learning 
enhances a firm 's long-term competitiveness (Reed & deFillippi. 1990).
Divisions related to the firm 's core business are more likely to benefit from the 
firm's core competencies than divisions unrelated to the firm's core business. 
Furthermore, divisions with related businesses are more likely to transfer and share 
knowledge and skills among themselves, thus creating a variety o f synergies—knowledge 
transfer, sharing o f  facilities and resources, and functional consolidations (Ansoff. 1965: 
Amit & Livnat. 1988: Mahajan & Wind. 1988). Synergistic cooperation leads to internal 
efficiency and thus to high profitability. For example, firms with related businesses may 
use their core competencies (particular technical and managerial skills) to develop or 
exploit new business opportunities or markets (Palepu. 1985; Rumelt, 1982). Operating
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synergies allow the firm to gain a cost advantage by accelerating the sharing of 
operational improvement ideas (Porter. 1985: Trussler. 1998). They may also enhance 
differentiation in any activity o f  the value chains by utilizing product and market 
relatedness (Porter. 1985).
Unlike divisions that are unrelated to the core business, core-business related 
divisions would be expected to create operating synergies and. in turn, yield superior 
performance. That is because divisions unrelated to the core business have few core 
competencies in common with other divisions or with the corporate office, while 
divisions related to the core business share core competencies between and with the 
corporate office. In divisions related to the core business, economies o f scope can be 
achieved by conducting joint production and joint research and development between 
divisions related to the core business. In sum. divisions related to the core business enjoy 
the benefits of sharing and transferring core competencies with related business units. 
Based on these observations, the following hypothesis can be drawn:
Hypothesis I: Divisions related to the core business outperform divisions not 
related to the core business.
Core-business Reiatedness and Corporate Control
Diversification strategy begs another major corporate management question: 
"How do multibusiness companies manage the diversity o f their operations?" In a 
diversified company, some divisions are related to the firm 's core business, while others
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are not. The question is then: 'Should all divisions be treated alike or should they be 
treated differentially?" Universalists (Weber. 1947; Fayol. 1949) might argue that there 
should be one best way o f  managing a firm's divisions, while contingency theorists 
(Chandler. 1962; Chakavarthy & Lorange. 1984; Drazin & Van de Ven. 1985;
Donaldson. 1987; Hoskisson. 1987) would suggest a differentiated approach. Since 
Chandler (1962) provided the description o f the relationship between strategy and 
structure, the notion o f  fit between diversification strategy and structure has attracted 
attention from strategic management researchers (e.g.. Chakavarthy & Lorange. 1984; 
Donaldson. 1987; Hoskisson. 1987). The literature on the strategv-structure fit is the 
primary research thrust in strategic management literature (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1990). It 
provides evidence that structural implementation is an important contributor to firm 
performance.
Multidivisional firms can use two types o f  diversification strategies to achieve 
different economic benefits: (1) economies o f scope with related diversification and (2) 
financial benefits with unrelated diversification (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Related 
diversification increases opportunities to expand product lines and to create synergies 
between related product divisions by sharing their resources and expertise. Unrelated 
diversification increases opportunities to maximize corporate profits by adding profitable 
product lines and by reducing unprofitable ventures. Financial gains are the primary- 
motive o f unrelated diversification.
Studies on strategic fit provide useful insights for examining the relationship 
between core-business relatedness and corporate control. Researchers assert that
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economic benefits can be realized only if appropriate controls are in place (Hill. 1988: 
Hill & Hoskisson. 1987: Kerr: 1985: Lorsch & Allen. 1973: Markides & Williamson.
1996). According to them, when a firm tries to achieve economic benefits from 
economies o f scale, it needs to centralize operational controls but reduce financial 
controls. As a firm 's divisions are expanded around its dominant business, the corporate 
office needs to closely coordinate the activities o f  its divisions or business units. But as 
the lines between divisions are blurred, it will be difficult to isolate the financial 
contributions o f divisions independently, making divisionalized financial controls 
impractical.
When a firm attempts to achieve synergistic benefits from related diversification, 
it needs to closely coordinate the activities o f its divisions to share related resources and 
expertise between related divisions (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Decentralized operations 
do not produce synergistic benefits because they hinder the information flow and 
resource sharing between related business units. The information flow helps firms 
identify opportunities in one division that may have applications in other divisions. 
Related diversification requires only a moderate level o f financial controls because such 
tight controls would prevent divisions from cooperating with each other. Because the 
performance o f related business units are interdependent, independent and objective 
performance criteria cannot be established and imposed.
For divisions that are unrelated to the firm 's core business, the corporate office 
may need extensive use o f financial controls coupled with the decentralization o f 
operating authority and responsibilities. Because there is no operating synergy that can
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be achieved between the corporate office and its divisions and between unrelated 
divisions, the corporate office requires minimal operational information from its 
divisions. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that corporate managers are sufficiently 
familiar with the businesses o f divisions that are not related to the firm’s core business 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989). As a result, it is imperative that these divisions are left 
with operational autonomy. However, in order to achieve internal capital market 
economies, tight financial control must be exercised. Tight financial controls encourage 
divisional managers to maximize operational efficiency and corporate funds to be 
channeled to high yield projects. A separation o f strategic and operating functions may 
foster a psychological commitment on the part o f divisional managers to maximize 
profitability (Williamson. 1970. 1975). Based on these observations, the following 
hypotheses can be developed:
Hypothesis 2a: Divisions related to the core business receive a tighter operating 
control from  the corporate office than do divisions not related to the core business.
Hypothesis 2b: Divisions not related to the core business receive a tighter financial 
control from  the corporate office than do divisions related to the core business.
Core-business Relatedness and Division Risk-taking Strategy
Relatedness to the core business seems to have implications for formulating risk-
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taking strategies at the division. Some features o f core-business relatedness prompt 
divisions to pursue a high level o f risk taking. First, firm-specific knowledge achieved by 
collective learning may help related divisions discover new opportunities for product line 
expansion and. as a result, these divisions may become more active or risk taking in 
developing new products and markets. Recently, organizational learning studies have 
provided empirical evidence that risk-taking strategy is prevalent in firms with higher 
corporate learning, greater related knowledge, and varied knowledge and activities 
(Fichman & Kemerer. 1997). This is because they are in a better position to acquire 
knowledge crucial to a risk-taking strategy.
It is expected that divisions related to the core business are more likely to obtain 
greater and more diverse knowledge than are divisions not related to the core business.
As discussed earlier, collective learning in multibusiness companies is likely to occur 
around their core business. In the collective learning process, divisions acquire 
knowledge cooperatively and independently. The knowledge is then shared and utilized 
to define and solve problems generated in the process o f interacting with and adapting to 
external environments (Huber. 1991). Collective learning enables divisions to acquire a 
great and varied amount o f  knowledge about the core business. In the process o f building 
and transferring core competencies, they also may understand the means o f achieving 
competitive success in core business areas. Such means would suggest successful 
adaptation within environment boundaries (Prahalad & Hamel. 1990). It seems that their 
learning is not limited to what is changing but includes knowledge about how and why 
change is occurring. Thus, collective learning enables divisions to incorporate changing
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environmental realities into their competitive strategies for seizing new opportunities (Lei 
et al.. 1996).
Second, divisions related to the core business may perceive a lower level o f  risk 
when formulating risk-taking strategies than would divisions not related to the core 
business. The former will show a higher commitment to risk-taking strategy than the 
latter. Studies on risky decision making suggest that a high level o f perceived risk (or 
uncertainty) is negatively related to making risky decisions (Sitkin & Weingart. 1995). 
Uncertainty discourages managers from acting, but knowledge reduces anxiety associated 
with uncertainty. By having greater and more diverse knowledge about their business, 
divisional managers will have a better understanding o f  their strategic options and their 
outcomes. The richer the knowledge about the situation, the greater the accuracy in 
estimating the possible outcomes o f one's decisions (Fischoff. 1992).
Accurate information is more likely to be acquired in a continuous learning 
process. Collective organizational learning rather than individual learning can help 
divisions stimulate and upgrade their memory and learning capabilities (Dodgson. 1993). 
A knowledge base with greater and more accurate information about businesses may 
reduce the level o f risk perceived by divisional managers because it reduces uncertainty 
in framing the problem in the context of risk aversion. The reduction in perceived risk 
may help divisional managers accept certain risky strategic options (Goel. 1995). The 
association between knowledge and perceived risk leads to the expectation that divisional 
managers who operate in the context o f related businesses with opportunities o f  collective 
learning are more likely to make risky strategic decisions than would those in non-related
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businesses without the advantage o f collective learning.
Third, joint decisions involving divisional managers in related businesses are likely 
to make riskier decisions than those in unrelated businesses. Social psychologists provide 
a useful insight in comparing joint decision making with individual decision making 
(Dion. Baron. & Miller. 1970). According to them, for several reasons groups tend to 
make riskier decisions than do individuals. First, joint or group decision making, in 
contrast to individual decision making, diffuses responsibility among the group members 
(e.g.. Pruitt & Teger, 1969). Diffusion o f responsibility reduces fear o f failure and 
thereby enables people to make riskier decisions. Second, groups have a tendency to 
evaluate risk-takers more positively than non-risk takers (e.g.. Levinger & Schneider. 
1969). Finally, groups tend to stimulate individuals to accept risky decisions.
Individuals have a tendency to do riskier things in groups than they would do 
individually.
Divisions related to the core business seem to have more opportunities to 
undertake joint activities than do divisions not related to the core business. Core­
business related divisions are more likely to make cooperative efforts in performing 
organizational functions, including manufacturing, research and development, marketing, 
and other activities. Joint efforts are the means by which divisions achieve synergistic 
economic benefits. Operating synergy is achieved when divisional resources, facilities, 
and skills are shared among related divisions for superior performance (Goold & Luchs. 
1993). In the process o f sharing resources, divisional managers become more 
comfortable with each other, increasing opportunities for making riskier decisions.
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Based on these observations, the following hypothesis is formulated.
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Hypothesis 3: Divisions related to the core business show a higher commitment to 
risk-taking strategies than do divisions not related to the core business.
Core-business Relatedness as a Moderator
Core-business relatedness moderates the relationship between division risk-taking 
strategies and performance. The effects o f risk-taking strategies on performance are 
mixed. Most researchers on risk-taking strategy suggest that risk taking has a positive 
influence on a firm 's performance (e.g.. Griliches. 1986; Hill & Snell. 1989; Kanter. 
1983; Soni. Lilien & Wilson. 1993). However, it is possible that the relationship may 
not be as positive as risk-taking strategists expect. A risk-taking strategy such as 
innovation is a high risk-high return venture by its very nature. High risk ventures 
present opportunities for both high returns and high failure rates. Recognizing the nature 
o f risk-taking strategies, some studies have focused on the contextual factors that 
influence the relationship between risk-taking strategies and performance (e.g.. 
Calantone. diBenedetto & Bhoovaraghaven. 1994). Core-business relatedness provides 
such a contextual factor. It is speculated here that divisions related to a firm 's core 
business face a more favorable internal environment in implementing risk-taking 
strategies than do those that are not. The rationales are as follows:
First, the knowledge base acquired through a collective learning process 
improves the quality o f an organizational environment for implementing risk-taking
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strategies. Studies on innovation suggest that a firm's ability to understand the means o f 
achieving competitive success in a business environment and use it for potential strategic 
alternatives is as important as the original innovation in ensuring successful results 
(Anderson & Tushman. 1990; Porter. 1985). According to these studies, innovations 
aimed at extending technology and expanding markets require intimate knowledge of 
current industry conditions as well as emerging industry trends. Miller (1990) indicated 
that radical innovations to redefine markets and make path-breaking changes depend on 
understanding established markets coupled with a creative vision. Core-business related 
divisions perform organizational learning collectively to enhance such knowledge. Core- 
business relatedness helps divisions to gain greater and richer knowledge about the 
means of achieving competitive success in which they operate and encourages them to 
increase the potential for gains from their risk-taking strategies.
Second, operating and marketing synergies between divisions related to core 
business are likely to help them successfully implement risk-taking strategies. Cross­
functional and cross-product coordination are mandatory competencies for effective 
innovation exploitation (e.g.. Burgelman & Maidique. 1988: Calantone et al„ 1994: 
Damanpour & Evan, 1984). Coordination and cooperation not only reduce the risk o f 
failure by creating synergy but also defuse a sense o f responsibility among participants. 
Inter-divisional coordination can enhance the efficiency of risk-taking strategies by 
reducing fixed costs and duplicated investments (Kim. 1995). Sharing resources and 
job- related knowledge can also reduce the need for acquiring new resources and/or 
knowledge and thus yield a positive learning curve. Reviewing eighteen key product
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innovation studies. Barclay and Benson (1990) identified coordination activities as one of 
the most important attributes in new product success. In sum. divisions related to the core 
business are likely to exploit operating synergies on the basis o f their relatedness in core 
competencies. Operational synergies stemming from core-business relatedness would be 
a major critical factor for improving the internal environment for successful 
implementation o f risk-taking strategies. These discussions lead to the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division 
performance is moderated by the division s relatedness to the firm  s core business
Corporate Control and Division Risk-taking Strategy
The theoretical linkage for studying the relationship between corporate control 
and division risk-taking strategies is explained by agency theory. The relationship 
between corporate managers and divisional managers constitutes an agency relationship 
because the former delegates work and responsibilities to the latter (Eisenhardt. 1989; 
Fama. 1980; Fama & Jensen. 1983). Because the personal goals o f divisional managers 
(agents) differ from those o f  corporate managers (principals), the former may not act to 
serve the interest o f the latter, causing an agency problem. The goal incongruency 
between corporate and divisional managers affects their attitudes toward risk. Because 
employment risk is associated with poor performance, divisional managers would 
minimize their risk when making decisions on behalf o f corporate managers. Divisional
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managers may be more risk averse than corporate managers because they cannot diversify 
their employment risk, whereas corporate managers are better able to diversify their 
employment risk by diversifying their business portfolio (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988).
These differences in attitude toward risk create problems in sharing risk. Principals and 
agents who work on the same project may take different actions due to their differences in 
risk preferences (Eisenhardt. 1989).
Because o f  the differences in risk-taking preferences, the type o f corporate control 
can influence the nature o f the agency relationship between corporate and divisional 
managers and risk-taking strategies at the divisional level. Before we study the effects o f 
corporate control (full, centralized, and laissez-faire) on a division's risk-taking strategy, 
let us first look at the agency relationship and risk-sharing problems in conjunction with 
two attributes o f corporate control types: decentralization of decisions and operation of 
the control system.
Divisions subject to a decentralized control system are autonomous and directly 
accountable for the performance of the operations under their charge. Intervention by the 
corporate office occurs primarily when a division's performance is below the corporate 
managers' expectations. Divisional managers generate decision initiatives, choose one or 
a few o f them as their strategic options, and execute the decisions independent o f  other 
divisions (Arrow. 1971). By contrast, with a centralized control system, corporate 
managers still hold the authority o f decision making. Divisional managers may generate 
decision alternatives but execute the decision only if ratified by corporate managers. In 
the ratification process, divisional managers’ preferences implied in their strategic plans
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are checked and evaluated by corporate managers. Corporate managers with a 
centralized decision-making system are more likely to collect information about the 
behavior o f their divisional managers than are corporate managers with a decentralized 
decision-making system. Divisional managers* behavior under centralized control is 
likely to be monitored and evaluated more vigilantly by corporate managers than 
divisional managers under a decentralized control system. Consequently, divisional 
managers under centralized operating control are exposed to a low level o f agency 
problems than are divisional managers under decentralized operating control.
According to agency theory, a principal can control an agent on the basis o f the 
agent's outcome or the agent's behavior. Outcome-based controls may motivate an 
agent's behavior by forcing him to align his or her preferences with those o f the principal. 
But the alignment is only possible at the cost o f transferring risk to the agent (Eisenhardt. 
1989). It is because an agent's outcome results not only from his or her behavior but 
also from economic climates, change of consumer's needs, competitor's actions, and so 
on. Interaction between behavior and those context factors make outcomes uncertain.
The risk resulting from outcome uncertainty must be bome by either a principal or an 
agent.
In outcome-based control, a principal provides an agent with some decision 
making authority and. as the cost o f that delegation, the agent is asked to bear some risk 
from outcome uncertainty. In the same context, divisional managers, given 
accountability for profits and losses, have to bear the risk of their strategic decisions. To 
divisional managers, proposing uncertain (risky) projects is equal in effect to risking their
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future employment because outcome-based control does not consider the amount o f risk 
in evaluating performance (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988: Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Thus, 
under outcome-based controls, divisional managers avoid risk and favor decisions with 
predictable returns. Studies indicate that divisional controls using financial performance 
measures encourage short-term horizons and risk avoidance among divisional managers 
(Hayes & Abernathy. 1980: Hirst. 1983; Loeshcer. 1984: Norbum & Miller. 1981: 
Rappaport. 1978: Stonich. 1981). In contrast, behavior-based controls may motivate 
agents by monitoring their preferences in terms of first-hand knowledge and behavioral 
information. When the principal knows what the agent has done, the principal does not 
have to rely on outcome-based controls. Under these circumstances, divisional managers 
believe that the amount o f  risk can be recognized in performance evaluation and that 
their perceived risk level may be reduced when they propose their strategic plans.
Understanding how divisional managers react to the degree o f  centralization in 
decision making and the basis o f  control systems (outcome vs. behavior) helps us to 
speculate how they will react to different corporate control types—centralized. full, and 
laissez-faire. As noted earlier, centralized corporate control is the configuration in which 
operating decisions are centralized. In addition, financial and strategic controls are used 
only moderately because centralized operating control is confused by divisions with 
financial and strategic controls presupposing the decentralization o f  division 's operation. 
Under this type of corporate control, strategic decisions o f divisional managers are more 
closely aligned with the preferences o f corporate managers. This is because divisional 
managers are monitored and evaluated with behavioral information collected by corporate
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managers and the risk o f their decisions is more likely to be considered in the evaluation 
o f their divisional performance. Consequently, it is expected that divisional managers 
under centralized corporate control take greater risks. As a result, their divisions show a 
high level o f commitment to risk-taking strategies.
In contrast, full corporate control is a configuration in which divisions are 
decentralized with respect to operating decisions and the corporate office makes extensive 
use o f financial and strategic controls. As noted earlier, this type o f corporate control is 
usually associated with unrelated diversification or 'competitive M-form.' Because the 
corporate office lacks operating knowledge of divisions not related to its core business, 
divisional managers are given autonomy in strategic decision making and are evaluated 
on the basis o f financial performance. Under this type o f corporate control, divisional 
managers are likely to take strategic actions which may differ from corporate managers' 
preferences. Therefore, it can be expected that divisional managers subject to full 
corporate control avoid risk and favor strategic decisions with predictable returns. Thus, 
these divisions show a low level o f  commitment to risk-taking strategies.
Divisional managers under laissez-faire corporate control enjoy a higher level of 
discretion than do their counterparts under centralized and full controls. The laissez-faire 
control type is usually found in H-form firms or holding companies where the structure is 
loosely divisionalized and controls between the corporate office and divisions are limited. 
When control is exercised, it is more likely to be outcome-based than behavior-based. 
Compared with divisions under the two other types o f corporate control mentioned above, 
divisional managers under laissez-faire corporate control are more likely to take strategic
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actions which differ from corporate managers' preferences. This is because these 
managers are not under tight financial controls although they enjoy a high level of 
autonomy in operation decision making. These managers are not as responsible for the 
results o f their strategies decisions as their counterparts under full corporate control are. 
Furthermore, divisional managers are more likely to take advantage of the absence of 
tight corporate controls to benefit their own interests. Consequently, they are likely to 
avoid projects with a high level o f risk and likely to pursue conservative strategic actions 
only enough to maintain income stability. Their decisions will be directed toward 
maintaining the current competitive position and avoiding potentially profitable but risky 
challenges. Those managers are more likely to passively react to environment changes 
than to aggressively attack opportunities. On the basis o f  these discussions, the following 
hypotheses are advanced:
Hypothesis 5a: Divisions under centralized corporate controls show a higher 
commitment to risk-taking strategies than do their counterparts under fu ll 
corporate controls or laissez-faire corporate controls.
Hypothesis 5b: Divisions under fu ll  corporate controls show a higher commitment 
to risk-taking strategies than do their counterparts under laissez-faire corporate 
controls.
Hypothesis 5c: Dependence on financial controls from  the corporate office is
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negatively related to a division s commitment to risk-taking strategies.
Hypothesis 5d: Centralization in operating controls from  the corporate office is 
positively related to a division s commitment to risk-taking strategies.
Corporate Control as a Moderator
A strategic fit perspective provides a useful framework for explaining the effects 
of corporate control on the relationship between risk-taking strategies and performance. 
Research on strategy implementation suggests that an organization has a variety o f  
structural forms (including control systems) and organizational processes to choose from 
when implementing a chosen strategy, but ail structural forms are not equally effective in 
implementing a given strategy (Galbraith & Kazanjian. 1986). To be effective, division- 
level strategy must be implemented consistent with control systems o f the corporate 
office (Hill & Hoskisson. 1987: Govindarajan & Fisher. 1990). In this context, a 
particular relationship between the corporate office and its division is required for the 
successful implementation o f division risk-taking strategies.
Studies suggest that some control systems are more effective in implementing 
risk-taking strategies than other control systems (Gupta. 1987: Morris & Trotter. 1990). 
As noted earlier, control systems can be regarded as a process o f monitoring either 
behavior or outcome (Ouchi, 1977). These are referred to as behavior controls and 
outcome controls, respectively. Performance assessment according to objective outcome 
criteria has the merit o f precision and a detailed a priori specification. However, an
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outcome control system which depends on objective output criteria fails to quantify 
performance dimensions o f risk-taking strategies such as research and development and 
marketing efforts (Govindarajan. 1988). Researchers have also found that one major 
organizational constraint on managerial risk-taking is an oppressive outcome control 
system which does not contemplate subjective information for performance assessment 
(Morris & Trotter. 1990). Risk-taking strategies with a high level o f outcome uncertainty 
and a long-term horizon are difficult to quantify with objective performance dimensions. 
Given the high uncertainty, divisional managers are likely to be motivated to react in 
dysfunctional ways when forced to meet oppressive, short-term outcome goals.
A corporate office's overemphasis on outcome-based controls may discourage 
divisional managers from undertaking creative and innovative risk-taking strategies in 
favor o f short-term and tangible performance outcomes. Creative and innovative risk- 
taking strategies tend to be intangible and often unrecognized in the outcome-based 
control process. Commitment to implement risk-taking strategies often requires up-front 
investments that cannot be recouped to enhance the short-run objective goals. Gupta 
(1987) found that adopting a long-term and riskier strategy at the expense o f short-term 
cash flow can only be recognized with a subjective evaluation of divisional managers by 
the corporate office. This subjective information is gathered by observing and 
monitoring the behavior o f  the agent. High subjectivity in performance assessment 
almost always occurs simultaneously with high corporate involvement in and 
understanding o f ongoing events, decisions, and actions o f a division. Therefore, it can 
be suggested that an outcome-based control system is less likely to make a positive
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contribution to the performance o f  divisions with risky strategies than would a behavior- 
based control system with subjective information.
Studies of strategy implementation assert that uncertainties stemming from risk- 
taking strategies can be reduced through the mutual coordination of decisions between 
corporate and divisional managers (Gupta. 1987: Gupta & Govindarajan. 1986). Risk- 
taking strategies make an organization face conflicts with its external environment. For 
example. R&D projects must be modified in whole or in part as relevant environmental 
forces such as customer needs and technological trends change (Souder & Moenaert. 
1992). The greater the degree o f conflict between the organization and its environment, 
the greater the uncertainty it confronts (Pfeffer & Salancik. 1978: Thompson. 1967). 
Studies indicate that the greater the uncertainty in the environment, the greater is an 
organization's need for information-processing capacity (Duncan. 1973: Galbraith. 1973: 
Tushman & Nadler. 1978). Accordingly, for effective implementation, risk-taking 
strategies should call for greater organizational information-processing capacity. A 
division's capacity for information-processing can be enhanced through mutual 
coordination between the corporate office and the division because such coordination 
allows for a spontaneous and open exchange o f information and ideas.
Coordination between the corporate office and the division can be achieved by 
formal or informal systems. A corporation's formal system o f strategic planning 
involving divisions is a good example o f the mutual coordination between the corporate 
office and its division. But the primary' utility o f formal planning systems lies in a 
strategic review at pre-specified intervals, not in ongoing adjustments during the course
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o f the year (Lorange & Vancil. 1978). Unexpected environmental events and conflicts 
generate the need for ongoing adjustments and information processing. Therefore, 
mutual coordination necessary for effective implementation o f risk-taking strategies can 
be achieved primarily by openness and informality in the relationship between a 
corporate office and its divisions, not by a formal strategic planning system (Gupta.
1987). This open and informal relationship between the corporate office and the division 
can help corporate executives become more knowledgeable about a division. This is 
likely to be particularly beneficial for divisions implementing risk-taking strategies.
Some studies have focused their attention on the impact o f inter-divisional 
coordination and cooperation on implementing divisional strategies (Kim. 1995). 
According to them, uncertainties resulting from risk-taking strategies can be reduced by 
inter-division coordination o f risk-taking strategic activities and the acquisition of 
required information. For instance, one division with a risk-taking strategy such as 
technological innovation or new market penetration can reduce the impact o f uncertainty 
from technology or market through coordination with other divisions with a similar risk- 
taking strategy. Divisions can implement their risk-taking strategies in cooperation with 
each other under the control o f their corporate office. Knowledge, skills, and resources 
can be shared through inter-division coordination such as the inter-divisional exchange 
o f personnel and various meetings. Complementary investments can be made among the 
divisions o f a corporation (Hoskisson et al.. 1993). Therefore, divisions under 
organizational processes which are able to facilitate inter-division coordination of risk- 
taking strategies are more likely to reduce uncertainties they face. In this way. they can
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implement their strategies more effectively than divisions without the organizational 
process.
Following a strategic fit perspective, this study proposes that divisions that enjoy 
a cooperative relationship with their corporate office as well as enjoy inter-divisional 
cooperation are more likely to achieve better performance from implementing risk-taking 
strategies. It seems that they would outperform the divisions under the corporate-division 
relationship in which mutual coordination and inter-divisional coordination activities are 
relatively less feasible and financial targets are highly emphasized. A particular corporate 
control type may generate the corporate-division relationship which supports these 
activities more easily than others. Based on discussions thus far. we can speculate the 
following set o f organizational contingencies that explain the relationship between 
corporate control, risk-taking strategy, and performance.
First, subjective performance evaluation of divisional managers is more likely to 
occur under a centralized corporate control system than under a decentralized corporate 
control system. When corporate managers work closely with divisional managers, they 
should be able to observe the behavior and thoughts o f divisional managers, which make 
subjective performance evaluation possible (Gupta. 1987). Centralized corporate control 
helps corporate managers become more knowledgeable about the division, its products, 
and decision processes. Centralization rather than decentralization can help both 
corporate and divisional managers to develop open and informal communication channels 
for information exchange. Heavy involvement in divisional operations by the corporate 
office provides corporate officers with the opportunity to understand the difficulties that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
divisional managers face in implementing their strategies and to obtain behavior-based 
information for performance assessment.
Second, coordination between divisions is more likely to occur in a centralized 
corporate control system than in one with a highly decentralized control. In a centralized 
operation, corporate managers are knowledgeable about divisional operations and thus 
should be able to assist their divisions when such needs arise. Divisions that are 
relatively independent and deal with each other on a formal basis would need more time 
for corporate as well as divisional managers in order to understand the situations which 
inter-divisional cooperations are needed. Arms-length relations between a corporate 
office and its divisions hinder the development o f open and informal working relations.
Some degree o f centralized control over strategic and operating decisions o f 
interdependent divisions is required for successfully implementing risk-taking strategies. 
For instance. Child (1984) indicated that some centralization is necessary to achieve 
inter-divisional coordination. Berg (1973) and Pitts (1977) found that the interdivisional 
sharing o f technological resources can be achieved through the centralization o f research 
activities. Mintzberg (1983) also argued that centralized control over the functions 
common to the divisions facilitates coordination between them. It is suggested here that 
divisions under centralized corporate controls are more likely to be able to plan and 
perform coordinated activities than their counterparts under full or laissez-faire controls.
Lastly, divisions under full corporate controls are likely to be effective in linking 
risky projects to goal attainment because their tight financial and strategic controls force 
divisions to develop marketable products in order to achieve their financial objectives.
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Divisions under laissez-faire controls are less likely to implement risk-taking strategies as 
effectively as divisions under centralized and/or full controls. Because they enjoy a high 
level o f autonomy in a relatively loose corporate control system, they do not face pressure 
from the corporate office to reach certain financial objectives. Furthermore, the higher 
level o f decentralization makes corporate managers develop an open and informal 
relationship with divisional managers by which they can exert some influence. The 
above discussions lead to the development o f the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6a: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division 
performance is moderated by corporate control type (i.e.. full, centralized, or 
laissez-faire).
Hypothesis 6b: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division 
performance is moderated by dependence on financial control: the interaction 
between dependence on financial control and division risk-taking strategy' is 
negatively related to division performance.
Hypothesis 6c: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division 
performance is moderated by centralization o f  operating control: the interaction 
between centralization o f  operating control and division risk-taking strategy is 
positively related to division performance.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODS
This chapter explains the research methods used to test the research hypotheses 
developed in Chapter II. The first section discusses the sample and data used in this 
research. The second section describes the measures used and their operationalization. 
The last section focuses on the statistical analyses used in the study.
Sample and Data
The sample for this study was drawn from a list o f Korean business groups which 
was compiled and published by the Bank of Korea in 1997. The list includes 63 large 
Korean business groups. To develop the sampling plan o f this study, the unit o f analysis 
must be considered in the proposed relationships o f the research model. Since research 
hypotheses were developed to test at the divisional level, the unit o f analysis is the 
division within a business group. In the Korean case, this unit o f analysis corresponds to 
affiliated companies o f the business group.
Manufacturing firms which are affiliated with business groups were subjected to 
empirical study. To be included, a manufacturing firm had to be traded on the Korea 
Stock Exchange or registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and its 
number o f employees in 1995 had to exceed one hundred and fifty. These criteria 
characterized the main divisions o f Korean business groups. Using these criteria, the 
companies to be surveyed were drawn from A List o f  63 Largest Korean Business Groups
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and Their Subsidiaries complied and published by the Bank of Korea. The subject 
companies are composed of 192 manufacturing companies affiliated with 50 business 
groups. Appendix A shows the business groups included in the survey.
The data regarding corporate control and R&D investment was collected by 
questionnaire survey. The questionnaire was developed from two questionnaires used in 
previous studies: H ill's (1988) and Markides and W illiamson's (1996). Those previous 
questionnaires were developed for collecting relevant data from multidivisional firms. 
They were used to study U.S. and U.K. multibusiness companies. Although the 
subsidiaries o f Korean business groups are legally independent, they are closely affiliated 
with the business group and act as if they are part o f a multidivisional company. 
Modifications to the questionnaire were required for this study because the study deals 
with legally independent, but affiliated, companies and their relationships with the group 
planning office o f the business group.
The final version o f the survey questionnaire was the result o f three stages o f 
development. At the first stage, two researchers who are familiar with the management 
practices o f Korean business groups assisted in modifying the questionnaire to match 
Korean circumstances. A revised version with some modifications, at the second stage, 
was developed into a pilot test version o f the survey questionnaire by incorporating 
professional advice and comments from two experts in studying Korean business groups. 
At the last stage, comments from three first-line managers o f Korean companies were 
collected and incorporate into the final version o f  the survey questionnaire. The basic 
framework o f the questionnaires used in previous studies was maintained. However.
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words, expressions and situations in the questions were examined and modified to ensure 
matching the situation statements used for U.S. and U.K. firms with the situations 
between groups and member companies o f  Korean business groups. The questionnaire 
used in the study is shown in Appendix B.
The final questionnaire was mailed to the Chief Planning Officers o f the selected 
affiliated companies o f Korean business groups, all o f whom are knowledgeable about 
overall business group operations and the relationship between group and member 
companies. In total. 57 firms from 32 business groups responded to the survey, for a 
response rate of 29.69 percent. This return rate is comparable with the rates reported by 
prior studies employing questionnaire surveys with top managers as major subjects1. 
Considering the chaotic situation2 facing Korean companies during the survey period, the 
response rate was acceptable. All respondents worked at the planning office o f affiliated 
companies and their average tenure at the companies was 10.18 years. Industry 
membership of the sample firms is presented in Table 3-1.
The results of reviewing articles published in Strategic Management Journal from 1980 through 
1995 showed that 45 studies employed a questionnaire survey research method and 38 of them 
had top managers, including CEOs and executives, as the subject of questionnaire survey. The 
response rates of these survey studies range between 11 percent and 87 percent. The average rate 
is 34.72 percent.
During the time period of the survey, the Korean government faced a foreign exchange crisis 
and applied for bailout funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on December 4. 1997. 
Korean firms were asked by the IMF to perform corporate restructuring and enhance 
management transparency. Due to this crisis. Korean firms began to work their way through 
financial hardships resulting from a high interest rate and a high exchange rate.
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TABLE 3-1 
Industry Membership of Respondents’ Firms
Industry Frequency
Food Products and Beverages j
Textiles 6
Leather. Luggage and Footwear 1
Pulp. Paper and Paper Products 1
Coke. Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel ->
Chemicals and Chemical Products 9
Other Nonmetallic Mineral Products 5
Basic Metals 6
Machinery and Equipment 4
Office. Accounting and Computing Machinery ■>
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 1
Radio. Television and Communication Equipment 12
Motor Vehicles
Other Transport Equipment -»j
Total 57
Potential nonrespondent biases were checked by comparing respondents' firms 
and nonrespondents' firms with respect to their size (measured by their assets and 
employees) and their profitability (measured by return on assets and sales growth) for 
1994-1995. First, the size o f respondents' firms was compared to that o f nonrespondents' 
firms in terms of their assets and number o f  employees for 1994-1995. The results of the 
nonparametric test indicated that nonrespondents's firms did not differ significantly (at 
the p  < 0.05 level in the Mann-Whitney test) from the respondents with respect to number 
o f employees. However. a significant difference (p = 0.032) was found for their total 
assets. It is speculated that relatively bigger companies (in terms o f assets) were more
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likely to respond to the survey because most surv ey research focused on large firms rather 
than on small firms so that they, relatively large firms, seem more exposed to this kind of 
survey research (experience effect). As a follow-up analysis, the total assets for 
responding companies were compared to the average total assets o f the population. 
Although the mean total assets were higher for the sample, the difference was not 
statistically significant. Second, the profitability o f  respondents' firms was compared to 
that o f nonrespondents with respect to return on assets (ROA) and sales growth for 1994- 
1995. No significant difference was found between the two sets o f companies on these 
criteria at the p  = 0.05 level (/-value of -0.94 for ROA and /-value o f -0.76 for sales 
growth). Overall, results support the representativeness o f the sample.
Data regarding the degree of internationalization was collected from secondary 
sources including Annual Corporation Reports (Hoisa Yonkam in Korean) for 1993-1995. 
published in 1996 by Maeil Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f Korea. The Investment 
Guide to Korean Companies, published by Samsung Securities Co. Ltd.. and The Korea 
Company Handbook, published by Ssangyong Investment & Securities Co. Ltd. 
Industry-level data regarding performance. R&D investment, and internationalization 
were collected from publications including The Korea Statistical Yearbook for 1993- 
1995. published by the National Statistical Office in the Republic of Korea, and Financial 
Statement Analysis for 1993-1995. published by the Bank o f Korea. Lastly, firm 
performance measures were collected from secondary sources including Annual 
Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. published by Maeil Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd. 
o f Korea, and the KIS FAS database, made by Korean Investors Services. Inc.




Core-business relatedness was measured by dummy variable coding for each 
division's relatedness to the core business o f the business group: divisions related to the 
core business vs. divisions not related to the core business. The approach taken for 
measurement: (1) identified individual businesses o f the business group to which a 
division belongs: (2) identified the core business o f the relevant business group: and (3) 
evaluated whether each division was related or not related to the core business. First, 
individual businesses were identified by product difference. That is. each product or 
product type was considered to be a separate business. The system for product 
classification was drawn from Korean Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). In 
strategy research, the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system has been widely 
used as a basis for identifying individual businesses and measuring interrelations among 
businesses (e.g.. Montgomery & Wemerfelt. 1988: Palepu. 1985). Individual businesses 
of the business group were identified according to four-digit Korean SIC industries.
Second, to operationalize the concept o f core business, two major dimensions 
were used: the relative contribution o f each individual business to the group's total sales 
and the age o f each business in the group. As discussed in the last chapter, the concept of 
core business involves the relative significance of each business to the corporation and 
the expertise generated in each business. The sales contribution o f each individual 
business unit or division to the corporation has been widely accepted by academics and 
practitioners as a major indicator showing the relative significance o f  each unit or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
division. This indicator has been used in portfolio analysis techniques such as the BCG 
matrix to develop corporate strategies for multibusiness corporations (Wheelen <£:
Hunger. 1995).
This study considered the age o f each business in the group as an indicator of the 
degree of knowledge about its business operation and competitive environments and the 
degree o f collective learning between the corporate office and divisions related the 
individual business. Prior studies on organizational learning suggest that there is a 
relationship between a corporation's age and organizational learning. For example. Child 
and Keiser (1981) argue that organizations learn from experience either by strategic 
choice or by aging. Starbuck (1965) found that organizations learn more and more about 
coping with their environment, external and internal, as they grow older. March and his 
colleagues (1991) argue that what is learned from any particular kind of experience varies 
substantially across time. Economists also suggest that organizational learning is the 
outcome o f cumulative experience across time (Dodgson. 1993).
To identify the core business(es) o f relevant business groups, first, the relative 
significance to the corporation o f  each individual business was evaluated. The expected 
sales contribution was used as the cutoff point to judge whether each individual business 
is a relatively significant business or not in its group. The expected sales contribution 
was obtained by dividing the total sales o f the business group by the number of individual 
businesses. The basic logic o f  the identification is that the difference in sales 
contributions between individual businesses represents their relative significance to the 
group. If every business is equally significant, it will show an equal contribution to the
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total sales o f its business group. As a second step, ages o f divisions in relatively 
important business!es) were considered in judging whether each relatively important 
business is a core business or not. Finally, to enhance the validity of identification, tw-o 
books about Korean business groups were referred to before final judgements: A Study o f  
Korean Chaebols (Cho. 1994) and Chaebols (Seoul Economy. 1995). As a result o f  the 
identification process, relevant business groups were found to have, on average. 1. 69 
core businesses (the range being 1 to 3).
Third, the Korean SIC system was again used to evaluate whether each 
responding division is related to the identified core business(es) o f its business group.
The two-digit Korean SIC level classification was used to define the same industry group. 
Divisions in the same industry group of the core business were considered to be related to 
the core business. In diversification strategy research, the SIC system-based approach to 
‘relatedness', such as the concentric index (Montgomery & Hariharan. 1991). and the 
entropy index (Palepu. 1985). has used the definition o f  industry group and segment 
according to the two-digit SIC level o f classification.
As a result o f the identification o f core business relatedness, twenty-seven 
divisions were classified as being not related to the core business and thirty divisions 
were identified as divisions related to the core business. Relevant data were collected 
from Annual Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. published by the Maeil Business 
Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f Korea.
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Corporate Control
Corporate control was measured using configurations consisting o f three basic 
dimensions o f corporate control: operating, financial and strategic. From the 
questionnaire responses, a multi-item scale was constructed for each dimension of 
corporate control. These scales are as follows:
Operating. This scale measured the degree to which operating decisions are 
centralized within the group. It was constructed from the mean response to twenty-three 
questions. Respondents were asked to indicate on a four-point Likert scale the extent to 
which the corporate office has decision-making authority for operating decisions. A high 
score on Operating meant that the authority for operating decisions was centralized at the 
group planning office.
Financial. This scale measured the degree to which abstract profit criteria are used 
by the group planning office to evaluate member companies' performance. It was 
constructed from the mean response to eleven questions. Respondents were asked to 
indicate on a five-point Likert scale the importance attached by the corporate office to the 
abstract criteria when assessing subsidiaries' performance. A low score on Financial 
indicated that abstract criteria were important.
Strategic. This scale measured the degree to which the corporate office exercised 
strategic control over member companies. It was constructed from the mean response to 
thirteen questions. Respondents indicated on a five-point Likert scale the degree to which 
the group planning office considered strategic factors when setting objectives o f member 
companies. A low score indicated a high degree o f strategic control over member
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companies.
Table 3-2 shows the mean, standard deviation, and Cronbach's alpha score for 
each scale. All Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients for the three scale variables were 
greater than 0.70. The coefficients o f this study are comparable with those o f the prior 
studies: 0.927 for operating. 0.726 for financial, and 0.886 for strategic in Hill's (1988) 
study: and 0.87 for operating. 0.72 for financial, and 0.75 for strategic in Markides and 
Williamson’s (1996) study. All three scales used in the study were regarded as 
satisfactory for established scales.
TABLE 3-2 
Summary of Scales
Scale Means S.D. Alpha Items
Operating 1.882 0.469 0.9062 23
Financial 2.407 0.638 0.8437 11
Strategic 3.611 0.546 0.8517 13
Cluster analysis was used to identify corporate control types from three main 
control dimensions. Outliers were detected before starting the partitioning process 
because cluster analysis is very sensitive to outliers. One case was deleted because it 
showed a profile quite different from the other cases. Thus, fifty-six cases were included 
in the partitioning process. The variables were measured on a standardization scale. This
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is because when variables are measured on different scales, variables that are measured in 
larger numbers will contribute more to the computed distance than variables that are 
recorded in small numbers.
This study conducted a hierarchical clustering and then refined the solution using 
a nonhierarchical clustering technique. Performing two methods complementarily can 
circumvent the problems or disadvantages o f two methods (Aldenderfer & Blashfield. 
1984; Sharma. 1996). Hierarchical methods have the disadvantage that once an 
observation is assigned to a cluster it cannot be reassigned to another cluster. On the 
other hand, nonhierarchical clustering algorithms perform poorly and. in turn, have 
suboptimal solutions when random initial partitions are used. The procedure used for a 
hierarchical clustering includes the Euclidean distance for calculating distances and 
similarities between the values for the items and the complete-linkage to combine 
clusters. The cluster centers resulting from the hierarchical clustering method were used 
as an initial partition in the following procedure, a nonhierarchical clustering method.
The K-mean cluster algorithm was used to classify firms according to their corporate 
control dimensions.
The results o f clustering are reported in Table 3-3. Three types o f corporate 
control were identified as expected. The F-tests demonstrate that each o f the control 
dimension variables differed significantly across the clusters. The scores in Table 3-3 
represent the mean values indicated by firms in a particular cluster for given control 
dimension variables. The three clusters can be characterized as showm in Table 3-4.
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TABLE 3-3
Corporate Control Type Resulting from Cluster Analysis
Cluster Operating Financial Strategic N umber o f  Cases
1 2.2873 2.3794 3.2074 1 J
1.7396 1.6860 3.9790 11
j 1.4832 2.8017 3.9056
Overall Means 1.8630 2.4091 3.6332
F 51.2410** 17.3101** 22.5962**




Cluster 1 Divisions with relatively strong centralized control over operating
decisions. They also had a moderate emphasis on market and strategic 
control by the corporate office.
Cluster 2 Divisions with relatively decentralized control over operating decisions.
They had a strong emphasis on market control but relatively weak control 
over strategic decisions by the corporate office.
Cluster 3 Divisions with relatively decentralized control over operating decisions. 
They had a weak emphasis on market and strategic controls.
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Specifically, clusters seem to show the three corporate control types observed in 
prior studies. Cluster I divisions showed control characteristics consistent with 
centralized corporate control: relatively strong centralization o f operating decisions and a 
moderate emphasis on market and strategic controls. Cluster 3 divisions showed the 
control structure characterizing laissez-faire corporate control: relatively strong 
decentralization of operating decisions and a weak emphasis on market and strategic 
controls. Cluster 2 divisions are decentralized with respect to operating functions and are 
characterized by relatively high utilization o f financial control, but they show a lower 
level o f utilization of strategic control than other clusters. Strategic control is a process 
whereby the corporate office determines the context within which autonomous divisions 
must formulate their competitive strategy. It has been argued that without strategic 
control the firm will have no overall sense o f strategic direction (Chandler, 1962). 
However, this characteristic may be observed partly because the Korean business group 
has a different structure. Member companies o f Korean business groups, while legally 
independent companies, may have somewhat unique patterns o f  a particular control 
structure, full corporate control. It is observed that most member companies o f  Korean 
business groups perform the function o f strategic planning at the member company level 
simultaneously with planning at the group level.
The characteristics o f Cluster 2 can be explained from another theoretical 
viewpoint. It has been observed in studies on the role o f corporate offices in the 
diversified corporation that the corporate office placing strong pressure on business-unit 
managers for profitability tends to limit the involvement o f headquarters in business
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strategy formulation (e.g.. Goold & Campbell. 1987). In other words, divisional 
managers or business-unit managers have not only the authority, but also the 
responsibility of strategy making. Emphasizing only financial targets without giving 
discretion for strategy formulation may be frustrating for member companies. It is 
because responsibility to achieve the objective targets outweighs the authority o f  strategic 
choice o f weapon to use for the achievement o f  financial goals. This perspective is 
consistent with the present study's finding. The findings point out that this issue needs 
more investigation and further empirical studies with other samples. This characteristic 
o f  Cluster 2 must also be considered when the findings are interpreted and discussed. In 
spite o f a difference in emphasis on strategic control by Cluster 2 divisions, the general 
patterns from operating and financial control dimensions matched with those presented in 
the prior studies. Therefore, this group o f affiliated companies was considered to be the 
divisions under full corporate control.
Centralization of Operating Controls
Centralization of operating controls was measured using the Operating scale. A 
high score indicated more centralization.
Dependence on Financial Controls
Dependence on financial controls was measured using the Financial scale. A low 
score indicated greater dependence on financial controls.
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Division Risk-taking Strategy
In this study, division risk-taking strategy was operationalized with two kinds o f 
division-level strategies: (1) R&D investment and (2) internationalization.
R&D Investment. R&D expenditure or investment has been used as an indicator 
o f firm risk taking in previous studies (e.g.. Baysinger & Hoskisson. 1989: Hoskisson et 
al.. 1993). Technological capabilities have been recognized as a central source o f the 
strategic competitiveness o f firms and countries (Helfet. 1994: Porter. 1990). However. 
R&D entails a high level of risk in that R&D projects by nature have high failure rates 
(Mansfield. 1968).
In divisions, the decline in immediate performance due to R&D project failure can 
be detrimental to managerial career prospects and thus, divisional managers have 
incentives to make a less than optimal level o f R&D investment. By contrast, corporate 
managers may be more concerned with the potential benefits o f R&D than with the 
associated risk because they can reduce their employment risk through corporate portfolio 
diversification (Amihud & Lev. 1981; Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). Thus. R&D investment 
can be viewed as a strategic behavior affected by agency conflicts. Also, like other risky 
decisions. R&D projects cause organizations to face uncertain outcomes and an uncertain 
task environment. The four major sources o f these uncertainties are customers' needs, 
technological trends, competitors' strategies, and organizational resources (Souder & 
Moenaert. 1992). R&D projects must be modified in whole or in part as relevant events 
unfold over time and new information is generated.
R&D investment was measured by research and development expenditures as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70
proportion o f total sales. In some studies, this measure is called R&D investment 
intensity (Hoskisson & Hitt. 1988). This measurement has been widely used in the 
literature (e.g.. Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989). It has been found to be positively related 
to measures o f innovative output such as patents (Hitt. Hoskisson. Ireland. & Harrison. 
1991) and new product introductions (Kamien & Schwartz. 1982). Using R&D 
investment as a proportion o f total sales, rather than the absolute amount o f research and 
development expenditure, deflates for size and controls for heteroscedasticity (Hambrick. 
MacMillan. & Barbosa. 1983). This measure permits relative comparison among firms.
In order to control for industry’ effects, firm-level R&D investment intensity was 
divided by industry’ R&D investment intensity (Dess. Ireland. & Hitt. 1990: Hoskisson & 
Hitt. 1988). It has been argued that industries differ with respect to the degree to which 
the field's market demands or accepts product innovations (Hambrick & MacMillan. 
1985). Industries also differ with respect to the extent o f their basic knowledge in the 
field in which they operate. The greater this knowledge, the more efficient will be the 
conversion o f R&D inputs into outputs (Bavsinger & Hoskisson. 1989). Thus, the 
measure o f R&D investment used in this study was obtained from the following formula:
Firm R&D expenditure/Firm sales 
Industry R&D expenditure/industry sales
This measure indicates the relative intensity rather than the absolute intensity o f a firm's 
R&D investment. It involves the firm's R&D investment which is controlled for size
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effect as well as for industry effect. This measure was averaged over the period 1993- 
1995. Firm-level data including R&D expenditures, and sales were obtained from the 
questionnaire and the Annual Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. published by Maeil 
Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f Korea. Korean industry-level data was obtained from 
Financial Statement Analysis for 1993-1995. complied and published by the Bank of 
Korea.
Internationalization. Some studies have operationalized internationalization as 
firm risk-taking strategic behavior (Brouthers. 1995: Shama. 1995). Internationalization 
o f the firm is usually seen as a process in which the enterprise gradually increases its 
international involvement and exposes itself to the international environment. This 
process evolves in an interplay between the development o f knowledge about foreign 
markets and operations, on one hand, and an increasing commitment o f  resources to 
foreign markets, on the other hand (Johanson & Vahlne. 1990). While international 
markets provide new opportunities, they also present increased challenges from 
international and domestic competitors. Operating firms in international markets with 
regional and national differences are quite complex and is not easily accomplished (Hitt 
et al.. 1994).
Scholars refer to risk incidental to internationalization (Miller. 1992: Vemon.
1983 ). For instance. Miller (1992) suggests details o f a three-part integration o f 
international risk variables: (1) general environmental. (2) industry, and (3) firm-specific 
risk. First, general environmental uncertainty arises when the general environment within 
a given country is different from that in another country. Included in this factor are such
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variables as political risk, government policy uncertainty, economic uncertainty, social 
uncertainty, and natural uncertainty.
Second, industry uncertainty includes the risks associated with differences in 
industry/product-specific variables between countries. Among these variables are the 
input market uncertainty and product market uncertainty, and competitive uncertainty.
On an international basis, industry' uncertainties are closely related to general 
environmental uncertainties because changes in the environmental variables such as 
supply agreements and trade laws directly affect industry uncertainties. These include 
input market uncertainties from the availability o f inputs and competitive uncertainties 
from the entrance o f new competitors.
Finally, firm-specific uncertainty includes operating uncertainty, liability 
uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty accompanied by firms operations in a particular 
situation. While these firm-specific uncertainties exist in the domestic market as well as 
internationally, the nature o f  international operations aggravate these uncertainties 
because the firm must perform these functions in different cultures where the 
relationships may vary significantly from the home market. Like this, international 
operations are by their nature risky and more difficult to be structured and controlled. 
Internationalization has been found to be positively related to m anager's risk aversion 
(Dichtl, Leibold. Koglmayr. & Muller. 1984).
In this study, the degree o f internationalization was measured as export sales as a 
percentage of total sales. Sullivan and Bauerschmidt (1989) report that the degree of 
export activity discriminates the relative internationalization between firms. Most studies
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regarding internationalization have used the export ratio as the estimator o f the degree of 
internationalization (Sullivan. 1994). Using this measure, rather than the absolute 
amount of export, the effect o f size can be controlled. Thus, this measure permits relative 
comparison among firms. In order to control for industry effects, the firm-level export 
ratio was divided by the industry export ratio. The measure o f  internationalization used 
in this study was obtained by using the following formula:
Firm export sales/Firm sales 
Industry export sales/industry sales
This measure indicates the relative intensity rather than the absolute intensity o f a firm 's 
internationalization. It involves the firm's internationalization which is controlled for 
size effect as well as for industry effect. The ratio was averaged over the period 1993- 
1995. Firm-level export sales and total sales were obtained from Annual Corporation 
Reports for 1992-1995. published by Maeil Business Newspaper Co.. Ltd. o f  Korea. 
Industry-level export sales and total sales were obtained from The Korean Statistical 
Yearbook, published by the National Statistical Office o f South Korea.
Division Performance
As indicated above, in the Korean business group, division performance in the 
relevant hypotheses can be measured in the form of an independent firm's performance
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because affiliated firms report their performance as legally independent companies.
ROA was employed as the measure o f division performance. ROA is measured as 
Net Income/Total Assets. Bettis (1981) argues that ROA reflects a return directly under 
control o f management. ROA is highly correlated with return on sales (ROS) (Keats & 
Hitt, 1988). It is also considered a more accurate accounting-based indicator than return 
on equity (ROE) for the Korean sample where the debt-equity ratio is high and capital 
markets are imperfect (Chang & Choi. 1988). To smooth out annual fluctuations in 
accounting data, three-year averages for the 1993-1995 period were used. Relevant data 
were obtained from Annual Corporation Reports for 1992-1995. In order to control 
industry effects (Dess et al.. 1990). the average ROA o f the firm's dominant two-digit 
SIC industry group was subtracted from the firm 's ROA. Industry-level data was 
obtained from Financial Statement Analysis for 1993-1995.
Control Variables and Covariates
Several control variables and covariates were used in the analysis. In testing the 
hypotheses regarding core-business relatedness or corporate control type as an antecedent 
o f division risk-taking strategy, firm size, a financial structure variable, and the existence 
o f a trading company in a business group were used as control variables and covariates.
In addition, core-business relatedness and corporate control type were included as each 
other's control variable because it is hypothesized that both will affect risky decision 
making at the divisional level. In testing the suggested model for relative R&D 
investment, firm size and one financial structure variable, the current ratio, were used.
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Firm size was measured by the natural logarithm o f Firm sales, which was used to control 
for economies and diseconomies o f scale. The current ratio was used to control for the 
effects o f funds available for allocation to research and development. The current ratio is 
a standard measure o f liquidity and is the ratio of current assets divided by current 
liabilities.
On the other hand, the existence o f  a trading company in a business group was 
used as a control variable in testing the relationship between core-business relatedness 
and internationalization or the relationship between corporate control type and 
internationalization. Since 1975. Korea has adopted the general trading company system 
for promoting the internationalization o f  its economy. Korean general trading companies 
have been operated for gaining economies o f scale in the world market and attaining 
international competitiveness through specialized export activities. The total exports by 
the seven general trading companies accounted for 50.4 percent o f all Korean exports in 
1997 (The Korea Times. 1998).
Studies o f general trading company indicate that, with a centralized intermediary 
approach, the general trading company facilitates trading activities and increases the 
efficiency o f  distribution o f goods (Cho. 1987; Kim. 1986). On the basis o f observations 
and theoretical explanations, one can propose that the existence o f general trading 
companies in a business group affects internationalization activities o f affiliated firms. It 
was observed from A List o f  63 Largest Korean Business Groups and Their Subsidiaries 
that while general trading companies are owned by the largest business groups, some 
other business groups have regular trading companies as member companies o f their
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groups. There has been no study about how different in terms o f activities for their 
affiliated firms general trading companies are from regular trading companies. Hence, 
assuming that two types o f trading companies both perform a similar role for their 
affiliated firms in the organization structure o f  business groups, this study focuses on the 
existence o f a trading company in a business group. A dummy variable indicating 
whether a trading company exists in a business group was used to control for the possible 
impact o f the general trading company on internationalization o f an affiliated firm.
In analyzing the interaction effect o f  core-business relatedness and division risk- 
taking strategy and the interaction effect o f corporate control type and division risk-taking 
strategy on division's performance, firm size was used as a control variable. Firm size is 
measured by the natural logarithm o f firm sales. In literature, there have been arguments 
concerning the effect o f firm size on its innovation. Schumpeter (1961) and Galbraith 
(1956) hypothesized that large firms and firms with extensive market power foster 
technological innovation more efficiently than do small firms. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, empirical findings consistently suggest that small and medium-sized firms, 
rather than large firms, conduct R&D more efficiently (Scherer. 1965: Schmookler.
1972). Three-vear averages for the 1993-1995 period were used for all control variables 
and Covariates.
Core-business relatedness was used as a control variable when testing the 
relationship between corporate control type, division risk-taking strategy, and division 
performance. It is because, along with the hypotheses regarding interaction effects, this 
study suggests the research hypothesis that core-business relatedness may influence
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division performance.
The industry effect, one o f most popular control variables in strategic 
management research, was not employed in the analysis as a separate control variable. It 
is because the effect was already controlled by dividing a firm 's value by the industry's 
average value when measuring the variables which can be influenced by industry 
membership. Those variables are division performance. R&D investment, and 
internationalization. It is noted in strategy research that they are influenced by industry 
membership and that findings derived from research design without industry control 
result in misleading interpretations (Bettis & Hall. 1982: Dess et al.. 1990)
Statistical Analysis
The conceptual models presented in Chapter 2 were developed into six statistical 
test models in Figure 3-1 to test the hypotheses developed. Several data analytic 
techniques were employed to test the hypotheses. As mentioned above, cluster analysis 
was used to identify member companies o f Korean business groups depending on three 
types o f corporate control: full, centralized, and laissez-faire. T-tests. analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), analysis o f covariance (ANCOVA). and multiple regression analysis 
were used to test the hypotheses.
More specifically, the relationship between core-business relatedness and division 
performance (Model A in Figure 3-1) was tested by using the r-test. The relationship 
between core-business relatedness and corporate control (Model B) was tested by using 
the r-test. Analysis o f variance was used to test the hypotheses concerning the roles of
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FIGURE 3-1 
Models for Statistical Tests
(A) Relationship between Core-bnsiness Relatedness and Division Performance
Core-business ; p .  Division
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(B) Relationship between Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control Type
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(C -l) Core-business Relatedness and Division Risk-taking Strategy
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core-business relatedness as antecedents of risk-taking strategic behaviors (Model C - l ). 
The moderating effect o f  core-business relatedness on the relationship division risk- 
taking strategy and performance (Model C-2) was tested by performing multiple 
regression analysis on the following model.
P E R F - b Q ^ b l «C O R E  +6,  ~RTS~b.  *C O R E - R T S - b ^  - C O N T R O L  - e  (1)
where PERF  refers to the division performance variable, industry-adjusted ROA: CORE  
indicates core-business relatedness (dummy variable); RTS refers to a division's risk- 
taking strategy, either R&D investment or internationalization: and CONTROL refers to 
the control variable, firm size.
To test the hypotheses concerning the role o f corporate control as an antecedent of 
division risk-taking strategies, analysis o f covariance and multiple regression analysis 
were used. Multiple regression analysis was performed on the following model to test the 
hypotheses focusing on the relationship between division risk-taking strategies and a 
particular dimension o f the corporate control.
R T S - b 0 +b x • F I N C O N T + b 2 ~ O P R C O N T + b i - C O N T R O L + e  (2)
where RTS  indicates a division's risk-taking strategy, either R&D investment or 
internationalization; FINCONT  refers to the dependence on financial control from the 
corporate office; OPRCONT  indicates the centralization of operating control at the
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corporate office: and CONTROL refers to one or more o f the control variables, firm size, 
the current ratio, the existence o f a trading company, and core-business relatedness.
The following regression models were used to test the hypotheses concerning the 
moderating role o f corporate control on the relationship between division's risk-taking 
strategic behaviors and performance.
P E R F = b Q+b^ " C O R P C O N T  x +b2 * C O R P C O N T 2~bi - R T S + b 4 ■C O R P C O N T , - R T S -  
b 4 « C O R P C O N T 2 *R T S + b s *C O N T R O L  - e - ( 3 )
P E R F - b Q*bx "FINCONT-*-b2 " R T S +b2 "FINCONT MRTS~b4 ‘CONTROL ~e (4) 
PERF=ba~bx 'O PRCO NT +b2 -RTS+b3 «OPRCONT  */?T5+64«CONTROL -e  (5)
where PERF  refers to the division performance variable, industry^-adjusted ROA: 
CORPCONT  indicates corporate control (dummy variable coding for full, centralized, or 
laissez-faire): RTS refers to a variable o f division risk-taking strategy, either R&D 
investment or internationalization: FINCONT  refers to the dependence on financial 
control from the corporate office; OPRCONT  indicates the centralization o f operating 
control at the corporate office; and CONTROL refers to the control variables, firm size 
and core-business relatedness.
As a summary of this chapter. Table 3-5 presents variables and data analytic
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techniques for each o f the research hypotheses. Table 3-6 then presents the measures 
used to test the hypotheses.


















Summary of Variables and Data Analytic Techniques for Research Hypotheses
1 lypotheses Dependent variables Independent variables Data analytic techniques
1 Industry-adjusted ROA Core-business relatedness - test
2a Centralization of operating 
controls
Core-business relatedness T - test
2b Dependence on financial 
controls
Core-business relatedness T -  test
3 R&D investment Core-business relatedness. Corporate control 
type, Finn size, Current ratio
- lest. Analysis of variance. 
Analysis o f covariance
Internationalization Core-business relatedness, Corporate control 
type, trading company
T - test, Analysis of variance
4 Industry-adjusted ROA Core-business relatedness, R&D investment, 
Core-business relatedness X R&D 
investment, Firm size
Core-business relatedness, Internationalization, 
Core-business relatedness X Internationalization, 
Firm size




















Hypotheses Dependent variables Independent variables Data analytic techniques
5a R&D investment Corporate control type, Core-business relatedness, 
Firm size, Current ratio
7 - test, Analysis of variance, 
Analysis of covariance
Internationalization Corporate control type, Core-business relatedness, 
trading company
7 - test, Analysis of variance
5b R&D investment Dependence on financial controls. Centralization 
of operating controls. F irm size, Current ratio, 
Core-business relatedness
Multiple regression analysis
Internationalization Dependence on financial controls. Centralization 
of operating controls, Trading company, 
Core-business relatedness
Multiple regression analysis
6a, 6b Industry-adjusted ROA Corporate control type, R&D investment. 
Corporate control type X R&D investment. 
Firm size, Core-business relatedness
Corporate control type. Internationalization, 
Corporate control type X Internationalization, 
Finn size, Core-business relatedness




















Hypotheses Dependent variables Independent variables Data analytic techniques
6c, 6d Industry-adjusted ROA Dependence on financial controls, R&D 
investment, Dependence oHlnancial controls X 
R&D investment, Firm size, Core-business 
relatedness
Multiple regression analysis
Dependence on financial controls, Internationalization, Multiple regression analysis 
Dependence of financial controls X International­
ization, Finn size, Core business relatedness
Centralization of operating controls, R&D 
investment, Centralization of operating controls X 
R&D investment, Firm size, Core-business 
relatedness
Multiple regression analysis
Centralization of operating controls, international­
ization, Centralization of operating controls X 









C ore-business relatedness D um m y variable coded according to whether a division
Corporate control ty pe
belongs to the sam e two-digit Korean SIC  
industries as the core business o f  its business group
D um m y variable coded according to the control types
Centralization o f
resulting from cluster analysis o f  three control dim ensions: 
fu ll, centralized, and laissez-faire
The mean response o f  survey questions about the operating
operating controls control dim ension o f  the corporate control type configuration
D ependence on The mean response o f  survey questions about the financial
financial controls control dim ension o f  the corporate control ty pe configuration
D ivision
risk-taking strategy 
- R & D  investm ent (Firm R&D expenditure/Firm total sa les) *
- Internationalization
(Industry R&D expenditure/industry total sales)
(Firm export sales/Firm total sales) *
(Industry export sales/industry total sa les)
D iv ision  performance
- Industry-adjusted Firm's average ROA *
R O A ” * Industry's average ROA
Control variables
- Firm size - Natural logarithm o f  firm sales*
- Current ratio - Current assets / Current liabilities*
- Trading com pany - D um m y coding variable for the ex istence o f  trading
com pany in a business group
* Three-year averages for the 1993-1995 period were used.
** ROA (return on assets) is m easured as N et Income/Total Assets.




This chapter presents the results obtained from the statistical analyses designed to 
test the hypotheses. The descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables 
included in the study are presented in the first section. The results of testing the 
hypotheses are then followed.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4-1 presents the descriptive statistics and intercorrelations o f all the 
variables included in hypothesized models. As shown in the table, intercorrelations 
among the independent variables were sufficiently low to preclude the problem o f 
unstable coefficients that may rise because o f multicollinearity. Although the sample 
consisted of 57 affiliated firms, complete data could not be obtained for all variables. For 
the variable o f internationalization, one firm was excluded because it did not have any 
export activity.
Results of Testing Hypotheses
This section presents the results o f the various statistical analyses performed to 
test the hypotheses. The results are organized for each o f the hypotheses stated in 
Chapter 3.


















Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrclations of the Variables in the Study
Variables N Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Dependence on 57 2.407 0.644
financial controls
2 Centralization o f 57 1.882 0.473 -0.149
operating controls
3 Strategic control 57 3.611 0.551 -0.052 -0 .598“
4 R&D investment 57 1.968 1.359 0.290 -0.330** 0.153
5 Internationalization 56 1.697 1.600 -0 .244“ 0 .428“ -0.182* -0 .130
6 Return on assets 57 -1.186 3.660 0.126 0.138 -0.020 0.221* 0 .3 2 3 “
7 firm  size 57 12.557 1.565 0.057 -0 .397“ 0 .293“ 0.178* -0.114 0.084
8 Current ratio 57 100.083 37.494 0.218 -0 .241“ 0.139 0.184* -0.194* 0.102 0.021
+ p '  0 .1 0 ;*  p <  0.05; ** p  < 0.001
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Core-business Relatedness and Division Performance
Hypothesis 1 states that divisions related to the core-business outperform 
divisions not related to the core business. The relationship was analyzed by using a Mest. 
Table 4-2 shows the results o f the Mest. The results suggest a significant difference in 
financial performance between divisions related to the core business and divisions not 
related to the core business (r55 = - 1.96. p  = 0.055). The finding supports Hypothesis 1.
TABLE 4-2 
T-test for Division Performance
Source n Means (SD) T- value Probability
Core business 30 -0.3067 (2.929)
-1.96 0.055
Non-core business 27 -2.1626 (4.171)
Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control
Hypothesis 2a states that divisions related to the core business show a tighter 
operating controls from the corporate office than do divisions not related to the core 
business. Hypothesis 2b states that divisions not related to the core business show a 
tighter financial controls from the corporate office than do divisions not related to the 
core business. Those relationships were analyzed by using a Mest. Table 4-3 displays the 
results of the Mest. The results suggest no significant difference in financial and 
operating control between divisions with or without core-business relatedness (/„ = 0.28.
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p  = 0.779 for operating control; t« = -0.25. p  = 0.802 for financial control). These 
findings do not support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. The results suggest that the firm does not 
differentiate its corporate control according to the differences in core-business relatedness 
at the divisional level.
TABLE 4-3 
F-test for Corporate Control
(A) Dependent variable: centralization of operating control
Source n Means (SD) F-value Probability
Core business 30 1.8652(0.436)
0.28 0.779
Non-core business 27 1.9010(0.519)
(B) Dependent variable: dependence on financial control
Source n Means (SD) F-value Probability
Core business 30 2.4273 (0.643)
-0.25 0.802
Non-core business 27 2.3838 (0.656)
Core-business Relatedness and Division Risk-taking Strategy
Hypothesis 3 states that divisions related to the core-business show a higher 
commitment to risk-taking strategies than do divisions not related to the core business. 
The data were analyzed using analysis of variance and analysis o f covariance. The
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proposed relationships o f  core-business relatedness was analyzed for two indicators o f 
division risk-taking strategy: R&D investment and internationalization.
Core-business Relatedness and R&D Investment. The effect o f core-business 
relatedness was analyzed after controlling for three potential interv ening variables: firm 
size, current ratio, and corporate control type. Analysis o f covariance and two-factor 
analysis o f variance were used to control for the effects o f the intervening variables.
These analyses were chosen in lieu o f one covariance analysis because a model including 
core-business relatedness and all three control variables failed to satisfy' one o f the 
assumptions o f covariance analysis: unequal slopes o f different corporate control type 
regression lines for firm size and current ratio. The unequal slopes mean that the 
regression lines o f  three different corporate control types interact with the covariates. firm 
size and current ratio. Thus, covariance analysis is not appropriate for the statistical 
model that includes core-business relatedness and all three control variables.
For analysis o f  covariance, firm size and current ratio were used as covariates.
Prior to analysis, the following assumptions o f analysis o f covariance were tested for the 
data: normality o f  error terms, constancy o f error variances, equality o f slopes o f the 
different treatment regression lines, and uncorrelatedness o f error terms. The results o f 
the assumption test suggested that nonconstancy o f  error terms existed in the data. To 
stabilize the nonconstancy, a logarithmic transformation was used on the measure o f 
R&D investment. As shown in Table 4-4. core-business relatedness is still statistically 
significant at the p  < 0.05 level after controlling for the effects o f two covariates (F  , 5(S = 
4.051. p  = 0.049). This result show that the difference in R&D investment between
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divisions related and unrelated to the core business exists after controlling for the 
intervening effects o f  firm size and current ratio.
TABLE 4-4
Analysis of Covariance for the Relationship Between Core-business Relatedness and
R&D Investment
Source /•'-value Probability
Core-business relatedness 4.05 0.049
Covariates 2.56 0.087
Firm size 4.06 0.049
Current ratio 1.06 0.309
Overall model 3.06 0.036
Two-factor analysis of variance was conducted to control for the effect o f 
corporate control type and potential interaction effects between corporate control and 
core-business relatedness. Prior to analysis, the following assumptions o f analysis of 
variance were tested for the data: normality o f  error terms, constancy o f error variances, 
and independence o f error terms. The results o f this assumption test suggested that a 
nonconstancy o f error terms existed in the data. To stabilize the nonconstancy, a 
logarithmic transformation was used on the measure of R&D investment. As the results 
in Table 4-5 suggest, the relationship between core-business relatedness and R&D 
investment is still significant at the/? < 0.05 level. The findings support Hypothesis 3. 
The results o f two analyses support that divisions related to the core business have more 
commitment to R&D investment than do divisions unrelated to the core business.
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TABLE 4-5
Two-factor Analysis of Variance for R&D Investment
Source F-value Probability
Core-business relatedness 4.07 0.049
Corporate control type 6.33 0.004
Interaction 0.72 0.490
Overall model 3.64 0.007
Core-business Relatedness and Internationalization. Three-factor analysis o f 
variance was conducted to control for the effects o f potential intervening variables: the 
existence of a trading company, corporate control, and their interactions with core- 
business relatedness. Prior to analysis, the assumptions o f analysis o f variance were 
tested for the data. Nonconstancy o f error terms was found from the assumption test. To 
stabilize the nonconstancy, a logarithmic transformation was used on the measure of 
internationalization.
Table 4-6 presents the analysis o f variance results o f testing the effects o f core- 
business relatedness on internationalization. The model was not statistically significant 
(p  = 0.399) and thus could not be interpreted. Hypothesis 3 was not supported for the 
relationship between core-business relatedness and internationalization. In summary. 
Hypothesis 3 received partial support. The results support the positive effect of core- 
business relatedness on R&D investment. However, the effect o f core-business 
relatedness on internationalization was not supported.
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TABLE 4-6
Three-factor Analysis of Variance for Internationalization
Source /•"-value Probability
Main effects
C ore-business relatedness 0.13 0.720
Corporate control type 1.98 0.151
Trading com pany 1.23 0.273
Interaction e ffects
Core business X Corporate control 0 .50 0.611
Core business X Trading company 0 .56 0.457
Corporate control X Trading com pany 1.84 0.171
T hree-w ay interaction 0.23 0.634
Overall m odel 1.08 0.399
Core-business Relatedness as Moderator
Hypothesis 4 states that the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and 
performance is moderated by the division's relatedness to the firm 's core business. It was 
expected that the interaction between a division's relatedness to a corporate core business 
and division risk-taking strategy would be positive. To examine this contingency 
hypothesis, the data were analyzed using moderated regression analysis that included the 
interaction term o f core-business relatedness and division risk-taking strategy. The 
relationship was analyzed by two measures o f division risk-taking strategy: R&D 
investment and internationalization. They were referred to as Model 1 and Model 2. 
respectively. Prior to analysis, the following assumptions were tested for the data:
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multivariate normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity. No serious violation was found 
for both statistical models.
The relationship between R&D investment and division performance was 
analyzed for the effect o f a contingency variable, core-business relatedness. Table 4-7 
presents the results o f the regression analysis that show how R&D investment, core-
TABLE 4-7
Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects of Core-business Relatedness'















Core-business relatedness X 1.112
R&D investment (1.456)
Core-business relatedness X -0.538
Internationalization (-0.930)




+ p < . 1 0 ; *  p < .05; ** p < .01 
1 f-statistics in parentheses
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business relatedness, and their interaction affect industry-adjusted R.OA at the divisional 
level. The designed regression model (Model 1) was not statistically significant at the p  
= 0.10 level (F  4 52 = 1.898.p = 0.125) and thus could not be interpreted.
The moderating effect o f core-business relatedness was analyzed using 
internationalization as a division's risk-taking strategy. As shown in Table 4-7. the 
designed regression model (Model 2) was statistically significant (Z*'4 5, = 3.038. p  -  
0.025) and thus, the results o f the model could be interpreted. In Model 2. the coefficient 
of the interaction term of core-business relatedness and internationalization was not 
statistically significant (p = 0.3568). This result does not provide support for Hypothesis 
4. No support was found for the moderating effect o f core-business relatedness in either 
Model 1 or Model 2.
Corporate Control and Division Risk-taking Strategy
Hypothesis 5a states that divisions under centralized corporate controls show a 
higher commitment to risk-taking strategies than do their counterparts under full 
corporate controls or laissez-faire corporate controls. Hypothesis 5b states that divisions 
under full corporate controls show’ a higher commitment to risk-taking strategies than do 
their counterparts under laissez-faire corporate controls. The relationships between 
corporate control type and division risk-taking strategy were analyzed with the two 
indicators o f division risk-taking strategy: R&D investment and internationalization.
Corporate Control and R&D investment. As discussed above, because a model
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including corporate control type and all three control variables failed to satisfy one o f the 
assumptions of covariance analysis, two analyses were conducted to analyze the 
relationship between corporate control and R&D investment. First, a two-factor analysis 
o f variance was applied for the data. In this analysis, core-business relatedness was 
considered as a control variable and potential interaction effects between corporate 
control and core-business relatedness were also controlled. Prior to analysis, the 
assumptions of analysis o f variance were examined. From the results of the assumption 
test, a nonconstancy o f error terms was found. To stabilize the nonconstancy, logarithmic 
transformation was used on the measure o f  R&D investment. As shown in Table 4-5. the 
main effect of corporate control on R&D investment was statistically significant (F :.55 = 
6.33. p  = 0.004).
To compare the means o f the three corporate control types, the Tukey method of 
multiple comparisons was performed. Figure 4-1 summarizes the results o f the 
comparisons. The nonsignificant difference between two control types is indicated by 
underlining and the significant difference is indicated by no line. There is no clear 
evidence of the difference in R&D investment between centralized and full corporate 
control. The difference between laissez-faire and full control wras not statistically 
significant. The results suggest that there is a significant difference between centralized 
and laissez-faire control. Consequently, the results suggest a significant effect o f 
corporate control on R&D investment.
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FIGURE 4-1
Results of the Tukey Method of Multiple Comparisons
(0.1086) (0.1579) 
Centralized Full 




0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
However, the results of pairwise comparisons among the three control types 
indicate that the findings were opposite to the prediction in Hypotheses 5a and 5b. That 
means that divisions under laissez-faire corporate control have a higher commitment to 
R&D investment than do divisions under centralized corporate control. Although the 
findings do not support Hypotheses 5a and 5b. the support for the opposite is significant. 
This point will be fully discussed in Chapter 5.
As the second test, the analysis o f covariance was planned to control for the 
potential effects o f firm size and the current ratio on R&D investment. The results o f  the 
assumption check showed unequal slopes o f different corporate control type regression 
lines for firm size and the current ratio. The test o f  parallel slopes was conducted by 
evaluating the statistical difference between a model with the interaction between 
corporate control and two concomitant variables and a model without the interaction.
The test results indicate that there is significant difference between the two models (FZAq 
= 2408.03). It means that the nonequality o f slopes o f different control type regression 
lines is statistically significant.
To evaluate the nonequality in more detail, separate regression lines were
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estimated for each o f the three corporate control types and then compared. As shown in 
Table 4-8. it was found that the regression lines for corporate control types interact with 
the concomitant variables, firm size and the current ratio in the form of nonparallel 
slopes. Therefore, covariance analysis was not appropriate for the model including 
corporate control type and all two concomitant variables.
TABLE 4-8 
Comparisons of Estimated Regression Lines
(A) Dependent variable: R&D investment
Independent variable: firm size (natural logarithmatic transformed)
Types n Slope Intercept
Centralized 23 0.1233 -0.0103
Full 11 -0.3932 6.6028
Laissez-faire 22 0.0253 2.3485
(B) Dependent variable: R&D investment
Independent variable: the current ratio
Types n Slope Intercept
Centralized 23 0.00059 1.4118
Full 11 0.00322 1.3990
Laissez-faire 22 0.00544 2.0776
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Instead, analysis o f  covariance was conducted only for corporate control types 
which satisfy the assumption o f equal slopes o f treatment regression lines. The results of 
assumption examination showed that covariance analysis is appropriate for the data from 
two control types: centralized and laissez-faire corporate control. The slope o f the 
regression line o f centralized control was equal to that o f  laissez-faire control (F, 4, = 
.005). Table 4-9 shows the results o f analysis o f covariance. After controlling for firm 
size and the current ratio effects, the main effect o f corporate control type was statistically 
significant. However, the adjusted means for two control types were not found as 
hypothesized (0.1086 and 0.3566 for centralized and laissez-faire corporate control, 
respectively).
TABLE 4-9
Analysis of Covariance for the Relationship Between Corporate Control and R&D
Investment (n= 45)
Source F-value Probability
Corporate control type 6.223 0.017
Covariates 0.966 0.389
Firm size 1.896 0.176
Current ratio 0.035 0.853
Overall model 4.483 0.008
In summary. Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported in the case of R&D 
investment. The results show that corporate control type affects division R&D 
investment. However, the results o f pairwise comparisons among the three control types
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were opposite to predictions in Hypotheses 5a and 5b.
Corporate Control and Internationalization. A three-way analysis o f variance 
was conducted to analyze the relationship between corporate control type and 
internationalization. In the analysis, core-business relatedness and the existence o f a 
trading company were included and the effects o f  their potential interaction with control 
type were considered in testing hypotheses. Prior to analysis, the assumptions o f  analysis 
o f variance was examined. From the results o f assumption evaluation, a nonconstancy of 
error terms was found. To stabilize the nonconstancy. logarithmic transformation was 
used on the measure o f internationalization. Table 4-6 in the earlier section presents the 
results. As shown, the tested variance model was not statistically significant again (p = 
0.399) and thus, could not be interpreted. These results did not support the effect o f 
corporate control on internationalization. Hypotheses 5a. and 5b about differences in 
commitment to risk-taking between control types were not supported either by the results 
o f the model with internationalization as a measure o f  division risk-taking strategy.
In summary. Hypotheses 5a and 5b were not supported. Regarding the 
relationship between corporate control and R&D investment, inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 5a, it was found that divisions under laissez-faire control were more 
committed to R&D investment than divisions under centralized control. Regarding the 
relationship between corporate control and internationalization, the tested models w'ere 
not significant and thus could not be interpreted.
Hypothesis 5c states that dependence on financial controls from the corporate 
office is negatively related to a division's commitment to risk-taking strategies.
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Hypothesis 5d states that centralization in operating controls from the corporate office is 
positively related to a division's commitment to risk-taking strategies. The influence of 
each dimension o f corporate control was analyzed with two indicators o f division risk- 
taking strategy: R&D investment and internationalization. They were referred to as 
Model 1 and Model 2. respectively.
First, the relationship between two dimensions of corporate control and R&D 
investment was analyzed. The results o f the assumption check indicated that the 
assumption o f homoscedasticity o f residuals is violated. To improve the 
homoscedasticity. a natural logarithmic transformation was used on the measure o f R&D 
investment. Table 4-10 presents the results o f regression analysis. Model 1 was 
statistically significant at the p  < 0.01 level (F  5 5I = 4.580. p  -  0.001). accounting for 
approximately 31 percent of the variance in R&D investment. The degree o f dependance 
on financial control was significantly (p = 0.078) and positively related to R&D 
investment, supporting Hypothesis 5c. The degree o f dependence on operating control 
was statistically significant (p = 0.007) and negatively related to R&D investment, not 
supporting Hypothesis 5d. Even though the expected association o f operating control and 
R&D investment was found statistically significant, the sign o f the relationship was 
contrary to the hypothesized sign.
In sum. Hypothesis 5c was supported but 5d was not supported when testing the 
effects o f two control dimensions on R&D investment. The results suggest that as the 
dependence on financial controls from the corporate office increases, the division's R&D 
investment decreases and that the centralization o f operating decisions increases, the
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division's R&D investment decreases.
TABLE 4-10
Regression Analysis for the Relationship Between Financial and Operating Control
and Risk-taking Strategies'
Independent variables Dependent variables
Model 1 Model 2 
.. .  .
Intercept 0.473 -1.522+
(0.511) (-1.740)
Financial control 0.210+ -0.051
(1.800) (-0.240)
Operating control -0.486'* 0.779”
(-2.788) (2.735)










~ p < . 1 0 ; *  p < .05; ** p < .01 
’/-statistics in parentheses
Secondly, the relationship between financial and operating controls and 
internationalization was analyzed. The results o f an assumption examination indicated 
that the assumption o f homoscedasticity o f residuals is violated. To improve the
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homoscedasticity. a natural logarithmic transformation was used on the measure o f 
internationalization. Table 4-10 presents the results of regression analysis. Model 2 was 
statistically significant at the/? < 0.10 level ( F 451 = 2.217. p  = 0.080). and explained 
about 15 percent o f the variance in internationalization. Although the dependance on 
financial control was positively related to internationalization, it was not statistically 
significant, not supporting Hypothesis 5c (p = 0.811). The degree o f centralization of 
operating decisions was statistically significant (p = 0.008) and positively related to 
R&D investment, supporting Hypothesis 5d. Therefore. Hypothesis 5c was not supported 
but Hypothesis 5d was supported. These findings indicate that the effect o f the 
dependence on financial control is not significant and that the centralization o f operating 
decisions influences positively the division's internationalization.
In summary, the results provided partial support for Hypotheses 5c and 5d. It 
was found that financial control was not significantly related to internationalization but it 
was significantly related to R&D investment. The results indicated significant 
relationships o f operating control with both measures o f division risk-taking strategies. 
Even though the relationship was significant, the direction o f the relationship between 
operating control and R&D investment was opposite to the prediction in Hypothesis 5d. 
The predicted direction was found on the relationship between operating control and 
internationalization.
Corporate Control as a Moderator
Hypothesis 6a states that the relationship between division risk-taking strategy
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and division performance is moderated by corporate control type. It was expected that 
divisions under centralized control would exhibit higher performance at risk-taking 
strategies than would divisions under the two other control types. Table 4-11 presents the 
regression analysis results to show how division risk-taking strategies, corporate control 
type, and their interactions affect division performance. Two regression models are 
presented in the table: Model 1 includes R&D investment as an indicator o f division risk- 
taking strategy and Model 2 uses internationalization as the indicator. Prior to analysis, 
the following assumptions were tested for the data: multivaraite normality, linearity, and 
homoscedasticity. No serious violation was found for either statistical model.
As shown in the table. Model 1 was not statistically significant ( F 748 = 0.867. p  = 
0.539) and could not be interpreted. Model 2 was statistically significant at the p  = 0.10 
level (F754 = 2.183. p  = 0.053). accounting for approximately 25 percent of the variance 
o f industry-adjusted ROA. The results indicate no significant interaction effect between 
corporate control and division risk-taking strategy. Therefore. Hypothesis 6a was not 
supported in both Model 1 and Model 2. The findings suggest that corporate control type 
does not moderate the relationship between division's risk-taking strategy and 
performance.
Hypotheses 6b and 6c focused on particular dimensions o f  corporate control type. 
Table 4-12 presents the regression analysis results for moderating effects of financial 
controls. Again, two regression models are presented in the table: Model 1 includes 
R&D investment as an indicator o f division risk-taking strategy and Model 2 uses 
internationalization as the indicator. Hypothesis 6b states that the relationship
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TABLE 4-11
Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects of Corporate Control1
Independent variables_______ j_______ Dependent variable = Industry-adjusted ROA
Model 1 i Model 2
Intercept -5.124 -6.279
(-1.042) (-1.482)










R&D investment X -0.295
Centralized type (-0.233)






Firm size 0.098 0.326
(0.275) (1.018)








+ /? < 0.10 : * p  < 0.05 : ** p<0 . 01  
1 /-statistics in parentheses
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TABLE 4-12
Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects of Financial Control'
Independent variables_______;_______ Dependent variable -  Industry-adjusted ROA
Model 1
j
j  Model 2
Intercept -5.124 ! -10.531*
(-1.042) (-2.333)




Dependence on Financial -0.947 1.787
control (-0.675) (1.596)




Firm size 0.017 0.226
(0.053) (0.780)








-  p < 0 . 1 0  : * p < 0 . 0 5  : **p< 0.Q l 
' /-statistics in parentheses
between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is moderated by 
dependence on financial controls. As shown in the table. Model 1 was not statistically 
significant and could not be interpreted (Fs 55 = 1.408. p  = 0.237). On the other hand. 
Model 2 was statistically significant at the p  < 0.05 level (F5 55 = 2.799. p = 0.026).
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accounting for approximately 22 percent o f the variance of industry-adjusted ROA. The 
results indicate no significant interaction effect between financial control and 
internationalization, not supporting Hypothesis 6b. Consequently, the prediction was not 
supported in both Model 1 and Model 2.
Hypothesis 6c states that the relationship between division risk-taking strategy 
and division performance is moderated by centralization of operating control. The 
positive sign was expected from the interaction term of centralization o f operating control 
and division risk-taking strategy. Table 4-13 presents the relevant regression analysis 
results. Model 1 and Model 2 both were statistically significant at the p  < 0.10 level (F<<6 
= 2.349. p  = 0.054 and Fs 55 = 2.315. p  = 0.057. respectively). Model 1 accounted for 
approximately 19 percent o f the variance o f industry-adjusted ROA. As shown in the 
table. Hypothesis 6c was not supported in Model 1. Even though it had the sign as 
expected, it was not significant at the p  -  0.10 level (p = 0.1195).
Hypothesis 6c was not supported in Model 2. either. As the results in the table 
indicate. Model 2 accounted for 18.8 percent o f the variance o f industry-adjusted ROA. 
Even though it had a positive sign, the interaction term of operating control and 
internationalization was found to be not statistically significant (p = 0.497). In summary. 
Hypothesis 6c was not supported. No significant interaction effect was found in either 
Model 1 or Model 2. The results suggest that there is no clear evidence that two control 
dimensions moderate the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and 
performance. The results o f testing all hypotheses are summarized in Table 4-14.
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TABLE 4-13
Regression Analysis for Moderating Effects o f  Operating Control1
Independent variables Dependent variable = Industry-adjusted ROA







Centralization of Operating -0.220 -0.259
control (-0.120) (-0.178)




Firm size 0.325 0.302
(0.980) (0.931)








+ p  < 0.10 : * p < 0.05 : ** p <  0.01 
1 /-statistics in parentheses


















Results of Testing Hypotheses
1 fypotlieses Results
1: D ivisions related to the core business outperform divisions not related to the core business. Supported
2a: D ivisions related to the core business receive a tighter operating controls from the 
corporate office than do divisions not related to the core business.
Not supported
2b: D ivisions not related to the core business receive a tighter financial control from the 
corporate office than do divisions related to the core business.
Not supported
3: D ivisions related to the core business show a higher commitment to risk-taking strategies 
than do divisions not related to the core business.
Supported by R&D investment 
Not supported by internationalization
4: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is 
moderated by the d iv ision’s relatedness to the firm ’s core business.
Not supported
5a: Divisions under cenlrali/.ed corporate controls show a higher commitment to risk-taking 
strategies than do their counterparts under full corporate controls or laissez-faire 
corporate controls.
Not supported
(support was found for the opposite)
5b: D ivisions under full corporate controls show a higher commitment to risk-taking 





















5c: Dependence on financial controls front the corporate office  is negatively related to 
a d ivision’s commitment to risk-taking strategies.
Supported by R& l) investment 
Not supported by internationalization
5d: Centralization o f  operating controls from the corporate office  is positively related 
a division's commitment to risk-taking strategies.
Not supported by R & l) investment 
Supported by internationalization
6a: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is 
moderated by the corporate control type (i.e., full, centralized, or laissez-faire)
Not supported
6b: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is 
moderated by dependence on financial control: the interaction between dependence on 
financial control and division risk-taking strategy is negatively related to division  
performance.
Not supported
6c: The relationship between division risk-taking strategy and division performance is
moderated by centralization o f  operating control: the interaction between centralization 






This research explored two major functions of corporate strategic management, 
diversification and corporate control, and their implications for divisional management. 
Specifically, this study examined the implications o f diversification for corporate control, 
division risk-taking strategies, and division performance. It also focused on the dual roles 
o f corporate control as an antecedent o f division risk-taking strategy and as a moderator 
o f the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance.
The findings o f the present study suggest that core-business relatedness is related 
to both division risk-taking strategy and performance and that corporate control is related 
to division risk-taking strategy. The results also indicate that different risk-taking 
strategies are related differently to core-business relatedness and corporate control. This 
chapter summarizes the findings and discusses their theoretical and managerial 
implications. The limitations o f this study and some directions for future research are 
also presented.
Discussion of Main Findings
The discussion of the main findings is organized for each of the research 
questions: (1) Does core-business relatedness matter to division performance? (2) How 
does core-business relatedness influence corporate control? (3) How does core-business 
relatedness influence division risk-taking strategy and performance? and (4) How does
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
112
corporate control influence division risk-taking strategies and performance?
Core-business Relatedness and Division Performance
This study found that divisions that are closely related to the corporation's core 
business were more profitable than those that are unrelated. As a further analysis, 
performance of divisions related to core business was compared with that of divisions 
unrelated to core business after controlling for the effect o f  business groups. In the 
research sample, eleven o f  thirty-two business groups had both related and unrelated 
affiliated companies responded to this study's survey. Related and unrelated divisions in 
each o f eleven business groups were compared in terms o f  industry-adjusted ROA. The 
results showed that related divisions outperformed consistently unrelated divisions in six 
out o f eleven business groups. Mixed results were observed in three business groups, but 
in only two business groups, unrelated divisions outperformed related divisions. These 
results confirm the hypothesis that divisions related to core business outperform divisions 
unrelated.
These findings support the previous findings o f Mahajan and W ind's (1988) and 
Davis and his colleagues' (1992) studies that business units with relatedness are more 
profitable compared to those that have less relatedness. The present study's findings also 
support theoretical arguments suggested by Rumelt (1974) and his followers that related 
diversification can have a positive impact on performance by allowing firms to make 
better use o f the resources o f a core business or to share resources across related 
businesses.
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The findings also support Prahalad and Hamel's (1990) argument that, for 
achieving a competitive edge for long-term success, each part o f a corporate portfolio 
must contribute to the core competencies that a corporation seeks to build and exploit.
The findings imply that if the corporation is unable to transfer a core competence from a 
core business to other businesses, they are wasting their resources. As Goold and 
colleagues (1993) indicated, the corporate office has the potential to create or to destroy 
the value of its divisions or units. For the current sample, a corporate office is more 
likely to create significant value for its divisions which are related to its core business 
than for unrelated divisions. That may be because it is easier for corporate offices to 
coordinate the activities o f its divisions which are closely related to each other in 
exploiting and sharing core competencies than the activities o f unrelated divisions. 
Divisions unrelated to the core business would not be able to benefit from core 
competencies o f the corporation created by the corporate office and/or other businesses. 
These findings indicate that a stick-to-the-knitting strategy o f a firm that limits 
diversification to the core business can create value for its divisions through the 
advantage o f being under one corporate umbrella.
An important contribution o f this study resides in examining core-business 
relatedness at the divisional level rather than at the corporate level. The approach used in 
this study is different from that o f earlier diversification studies. While the earlier studies 
fixed their attention to studying the diversification-performance link at the corporate 
level, this research examines the core-business relatedness and its impact on performance 
at the divisional level. Studying at the divisional level is better in understanding the
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effect between diversification on performance than studying at the corporate level. The 
value o f  relatedness realized at some divisions can be offset by the financial problems of 
divisions not related to the core business. This value can not be captured when 
investigating the relationship between relatedness and performance at the corporate level.
Core-business Relatedness and Corporate Control
The relationship between core-business relatedness and corporate control was 
viewed from a strategic fit perspective. It was suggested that divisions related to the core 
business would be under centralized operating control and moderate financial control 
from their corporate office because business activities of the divisions needed to be 
coordinated for achieving synergy effects. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that 
divisions unrelated to the core business would be under operational autonomy and tight 
financial control because there is no synergy that can be achieved by close coordination 
w'ith their corporate office and with other unrelated divisions. The proposed effect of 
core-business relatedness was not observed from the results. As Table 5-1 presents, the 
results o f a further analysis confirm no significant differences in corporate control 
between two division groups. This means that corporate offices in Korean business 
groups do not differentiate their control types between divisions related to their core 
businesses and divisions unrelated.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
TABLE 5-1
Corporate Control Types between Core Business and Non-core Business Divisions




Four possible reasons can be suggested for the lack o f  differentiated corporate 
controls. First, decentralization o f  operating decision-making might be primarily a reward 
for performance rather than a corporate strategy-dependent design variable (Gupta. 1987). 
Regardless o f the difference in core-business relatedness, the corporate office might not 
interfere with the operation at the divisional level if  its division performs superbly. 
Interpreting decentralization as a reward has been suggested in organization design 
studies. For example, Vancil (1979) suggested that when a division's or unit's 
performance fell below corporate office's expectations, intervention would be offered by 
corporate managers and the divisional managers' authority would tend to be curtailed. 
Lorsch and Allen (1973) observed that the amount o f supervision from the corporate 
office is positively related to the troubles faced by the division or unit.
Second, coordination and cooperation between core-business related divisions 
might not need a high degree o f centralization of operating decisions. It has been 
suggested that coordination and cooperation are required to achieve synergistic effects 
(Rumelt, 1974; Hill & Hoskisson. 1987) and that some degree o f centralization is
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required to understand the timing when coordination is needed across divisions and 
business activities in which coordination and cooperation must be achieved (Mintzberg. 
1983). This argument is based on the premise that information symmetry and goal 
congruence are necessary conditions for effective coordination and cooperation.
How'ever. if these requisites can be obtained by other management systems, a high degree 
o f centralization may not always be needed for effective coordination and cooperation.
For example, corporate managers' understanding o f the core business may be achieved by 
their long tenure. The purposes and methods o f coordinating and cooperating betw een 
divisions can be recognized and routinized through a long history o f interaction among 
divisional managers. At the initial stage o f coordination, divisions need intervention 
from the corporate office. Once the routine is established, coordination and cooperation 
activities conducted by divisions can be achieved through informal personal contacts
Goal congruence for coordination and cooperation activities can be obtained by a 
well developed socialization system rather than centralization o f operating control.
Control theorists have established the notion o f  clan (e.g.. Ouchi. 1980; Das. 1989). They 
argued that multibusiness firms can employ a clan mode for controlling their divisions or 
units (Ouchi, 1984). Unlike outcome and behavior control, clan control is based on a 
well developed socialization system within an organization. Organizations with clan 
control are social enclaves consisting o f companies and individuals who are bound by 
strong, non-contractual bonds (Chan, 1997). The glue which holds them together is a 
shared vision o f  their needs, their goals and their approved ways in which things should 
be done. It has been suggested that the social structure o f  Far East Asian family business
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groups, including Korean business groups and Japanese keiretsus. can be characterized as 
clan organization (Chan. 1997). As far as information symmetry and goal congruence 
can be achieved by a clan system and a long history o f interaction between corporate 
office and divisions, there is no need for differentiating corporate control.
Third, finding a strategic fit between corporate diversification and control system 
is a challenging task. To achieve the necessary strategic fit. managers must be aware of 
interactional requirements between the corporate office and its divisions and among the 
divisions to choose an appropriate control system. Also the impacts that a corporate 
control system has on the behavior o f divisional managers must be understood.
Managers are often confused about the negative behavioral consequences o f their 
controlling efforts due to a lack o f understanding o f interactional requirements and 
dysfunctional aspects of control systems (Tannenbaum. 1968; Galbraith. 1977). An 
example can be found in the case o f  Texana Petroleum Corporation (reported by Lorsch. 
Lawrence. & Garrison. 1992). Texana is a divisionalized company with related 
diversification. Close cooperation and coordination are needed among the related 
divisions, and yet the corporate office exercises formal financial control systems that 
cause the divisional managers to be at odd with each other. Similar problems can occur 
in Korean firms. Because Korean managers do not fully understand the interactional 
requirements between hierarchical levels and among business units, they may choose to 
exercise a uniform corporate control system across related and unrelated business units 
rather than attempting to differentiate their control systems.
Finally, bureaucratic costs for coordinating divisions may influence the need for
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centralization o f operating control (Hill & Jones. 1998). In order to achieve operating 
synergies from related businesses, coordination between the corporate office and its 
divisions must be realized to create value from skill transfers and resource sharing. 
Centralization of operating control is required to closely coordinate activities among 
related divisions (Hill. 1988; Hill & Hoskisson. 1987). Although divisions related to 
core business can create value from operating synergies, they should bear higher 
bureaucratic costs that arises from coordination among related divisions (Hill & Jones. 
1998). Because managers have different personal and professional interests and are 
pressure to perform, genuine coordination among those divisions cannot be easily- 
expected. This difficulty o f achieving effective coordination often nullifies the benefits 
from skill transfers and resource sharing (Liedtka. 1996). These high costs may 
discourage corporate managers from coordinating operating activities o f divisions related 
to core business for operating synergies. As a result, corporate managers may choose to 
exercise the decentralized operating control across divisions regardless o f core-business 
relatedness.
Core-business Relatedness, Division Risk-taking Strategy', and Performance
The relationships among core-business relatedness, division risk-taking strategy, 
and performance were viewed from a strategic fit perspective. This study focused on the 
dual roles of core-business relatedness as an antecedent o f division risk-taking strategy 
and as a moderator o f the relationship o f division risk-taking strategy and performance. It 
was proposed that the core-business knowledge achieved by collective learning among
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divisions leads to a high commitment to risk-taking strategy and that operating and 
marketing synergies based on inter-divisional coordination and accumulated knowledge 
about a competition paradigm positively affect the implementation process o f division 
risk-taking strategy. The expected relationship was supported by R&D investment but not 
supported by internationalization. The moderator role was not supported by both 
indicators o f division risk-taking strategy.
Core-business Relatedness and Division Risk-taking Strategy. It is interesting to 
note that two indicators o f division risk-taking strategy. R&D investment and 
internationalization, showed different results for the effect o f core-business relatedness. 
The results show that divisions related to the core business have higher R&D investment 
than divisions not related, while there was no significant difference in internationalization 
between two groups. One possible explanation can be suggested for this differentiated 
effect o f core-business relatedness. The different results found in two risk-taking 
strategies may reflect the differences in each o f the risk-taking indicators. R&D 
investment strategy focuses primarily on dealing with product and process technology 
opportunities for innovation. Export activities are concerned more with dealing with 
market opportunities. Seizing these opportunities depends on different types o f 
knowledge: that is. product versus market knowledge. It is possible that divisions related 
to the core business can take advantage o f the technological competencies in making 
R&D investment. Transferring and sharing these competencies occur only among 
divisions around the core business of the firm. However, international market-related 
resources and knowledge for export activities is likely to have a higher transferability
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across divisions o f  the firm than the technology-based competence developed for core 
business activities. It is because knowledge focused on the core business is industry- or 
product-specific but much foreign market knowledge is country- or region-specific. 
Foreign market knowledge, including the trade policy of a host country, can be shared 
and utilized among divisions even though they do not have much similarity in terms of 
product and process technology.
Core-business Relatedness as Moderator. Another important finding can be 
noted from results o f testing the moderating effect o f  core-business relatedness on the 
relationship o f  division risk-taking strategy and performance. This study, focusing on the 
complex interactions between corporate-level and division-level strategic behaviors, 
hypothesized the moderating effect o f core-business relatedness: that is. core-business 
related divisions would have better internal environments for successful implementation 
o f risk-taking strategies than would unrelated divisions. It was found that core-business 
relatedness affects division risk-taking strategy but does not moderate the relationship of 
division risk-taking strategy and performance. The findings on the moderating effects of 
relatedness is not consistent with the finding o f  Bettis's (1981) study that related firms 
achieve higher returns for research and development compared with unrelated firms. But 
the current study 's results provide support for Stimpert and Duhaime's (1997) finding 
that diversification strategy affects business-level strategy. R&D investment and capital 
investment. Combined with the previous findings o f  diversification studies, the findings 
o f the present study suggest that relatedness influences division performance and that 
core-business related divisions are likely to be more profitable because they make a high
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commitment to R&D investment for business success in their individual markets.
Corporate Control, Division Risk-taking Strategy, and Performance
The relationship among corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and 
performance was viewed from agency theory and strategic fit perspective. This study 
focused the dual roles o f corporate control as an antecedent o f division risk-taking 
strategy and as a moderator o f  the relationship between risk-taking strategies and 
performance. It was proposed that divisions under centralized control would have higher 
commitment to risk-taking strategies than would divisions under full and laissez-faire 
control. It was proposed that operating control was positively related to division risk- 
taking strategies whereas financial control was negatively related to risk-taking strategies. 
It was also hypothesized that divisions under centralized control had better internal 
environments for the successful implementation o f risk-taking strategies than would 
divisions under full and laissez-faire control. It was proposed that operating control 
would make a positive contribution to a division's performance with a risk-taking 
strategy whereas financial control would make a negative contribution to a division's 
performance with a risk-taking strategy.
This study found that divisions under laissez-faire control showed higher 
commitment to R&D investment than did divisions under centralized control. But no 
significant difference between groups was found by internationalization. Financial and 
operating controls were effective in distinguishing divisions in terms o f both indicators of 
risk-taking strategy. The moderator role was not supported by both corporate control
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types and each dimensions o f corporate control, operating and financial control.
Corporate Control and Division Risk-taking Strategy. The relationship o f 
corporate control and division risk-taking strategy proposed from the agency perspective 
was partially supported. The positive effect o f centralized operating control on division 
risk-taking strategy was found as expected when using internationalization as an indicator 
o f risk-taking strategy. But in the case o f R&D investment, the relationship between 
operating control and risk-taking strategy was found to be negative, contrary to the 
hypothesized direction. These inconsistent findings ask for an explanation and raise 
questions about the adopted framework to explain the relationship of the corporate office 
and divisions.
It was hypothesized that the commitment to R&D would be lower under laissez- 
faire control because o f the agency problem at the divisional level. But the study found 
the opposite to be true. This inconsistency can lead to speculation that the agency 
problem that usually occurs between a corporate office and divisions in the Western 
countries may not occur in Korean business groups. As mentioned in Chapter 2. agency 
problems result from information asymmetry and goal conflicts between principals and 
agents (Eisenhardt. 1989). The degree o f information asymmetry and the degree o f goal 
conflict between corporate managers and divisional managers o f Korean business groups 
may be unexpectedly low. Two managerial characteristics o f the Korean business group 
can be suggested as possible reasons for a low degree o f  information asymmetry as well 
as for low goal conflict: family participation in group and divisional management and the 
Yongo relationship at all levels o f management (the Yongo relationship means that high-
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Participation of founders and their families in business group management and 
divisional management might be a reason for low information asymmetry and low goal 
conflict. Researchers note management by family as one o f the major managerial 
characteristics o f Korean business groups (e.g.. Lee & Yoo. 1987). Most Korean 
business groups are managed by the founder-owner or his/her family. One study reports 
that 31 percent o f  the executive officers o f the top twenty Korean business groups consist 
of family members (Lee & Yoo. 1987). It is reported that, as o f 1987. 48.8 percent o f 
presidents o f member companies o f Korean business groups are founders and their family 
members (Shin. 1992). Even though those statistics are old. it seems that not much 
change has occurred in recent years. These family managers play the role o f  liaison 
between the corporate office and divisions and sometimes monitor non-family managers' 
opportunistic behavior. Family managers at core positions o f divisions can collect 
various and crucial information about division strategy formulation and implementation.
Another reason may be found in the relationships o f top managers at the group 
level and the divisional level of a business group. Key managerial positions are often 
filled on the basis o f  common geographical and school ties. These connections give those 
with the same background common identities (i.e.. homogeneity) and a sense o f 
belonging. And in turn, this works as an important factor affecting employees' behaviors 
(Kim. 1989; Lee. 1989). These homogeneous groups exert more influence and pressure 
for conformity than do groups that are not homogeneous (Festinger. 1954. Heider. 1958; 
Newcomb. 1956). The homogeneity from the Yongo relationship plays the role o f social
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control for ensuring the loyalty o f  subordinates and predictability o f  their behavior. 
Loyalty and predictability influence positively the level of trust among people involved 
(Butler, 1991). Thus, they are likely to attenuate opportunistic behavior and facilitate 
conflict resolution.
In Korean business groups, agency problems are easily found in the relationship 
between owner-managers and other stakeholders including minority investors and 
workers. Although more than 50 percent o f  outstanding shares o f  Korean firms are 
owned by outside minority investors, the founder families have absolute control of their 
firms and there is no effective corporate governance mechanism that protects the interests 
of multiple stakeholders against those o f the founder families' (Chung. Lee. & Jung.
1997). As a result, owner-managers can easily pursue their own interests at the expense 
o f the majority o f outside minority investors.
By way o f explaining the reason for the research results inconsistent with the 
hypothesis based on the agency theory', this study looks to the literature on organization 
design. This literature provides a plausible relationship between operating control and 
R&D investment (e.g.. Bums & Stalker. 1961: Thompson. 1965). It argues that a 
relatively decentralized structure is likely to provide a context in which more new ideas 
are generated than in a centralized structure. Kanter (1983) suggests that, in a 
decentralized structure, managers have more autonomy and more control over resources 
and these attributes enable them to initiate and test new ideas that can eventually result in 
innovations. Hage and Aiken (1967) found a negative relation between innovation and 
close hierarchic supervision. Further, it is suggested that centralized organizations
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increase the likelihood that promising new ideas will be censored or resources will be 
denied, reducing the number o f innovations adopted. In the centralized structure, new 
ideas must travel an extended chain o f command before receiving approval or resource 
support (Pierce & Delbecq. 1977).
Consistent with these suggestions and findings, the results o f the present study 
indicate a negative relationship between the centralization o f operating control and R&D 
investment (r = - 0.429. p  < 0.01). For the purpose of better understanding, a further 
analysis was performed. The data were split by core-business relatedness. The results 
suggest that the harm o f centralization would be relatively salient in the divisions not 
related to the core business (r= -0.287 at the p  = 0.10 level for core-business related 
divisions; r = -0.577 at the p  = 0.01 level for non-core business divisions). Under 
centralized corporate control, even though the corporate offices lack intimate 
understanding o f a division's individual businesses, they centralize operating decisions 
and strategic decision making and thereby fail to develop division R&D opportunities.
However, the suggestion in the organization design literature that a decentralized 
structure leads to a high commitment to risk-taking strategies is not consistent with the 
finding that the centralization of operating control is positively related to 
internationalization. The relationship between operating control and internationalization 
is contradictory to the relationship between operating control and R&D investment. Why 
did this contradictory finding happen? One possible explanation is that, in Korea, export 
activities are highly promoted by the government and are supported by corporate offices 
o f business groups. The rapid growth o f the Korean economy from an underdeveloped
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economy to a major economic power has been, to a large extent, the result o f the 
government's export-driven economic policies (Chung et al.. 1997: Sakong. 1993). To 
accelerate export-led growth, the Korean government provided Korean firms with 
intensive export promotion, including financial support for exporters, tax incentives on 
export sales, tariff incentives on imported raw materials, and so on. These export 
promotion activities encourage Korean firms to undertake active export activities.
The corporate offices of Korean business groups also have encouraged their 
affiliated companies to do active exporting in order to overcome the limit o f business 
growth that solely depended on a small domestic market (Shin. 1992). To this end. the 
corporate office provided its divisions with both tangible and intangible resources needed 
to internationalize their efforts ranging from exporting to foreign direct investment. 
Because the support from the corporate office depends on the relationship between the 
corporate office and a division, divisions under centralized control are more likely to have 
access to corporate resources than are divisions under decentralized control. It makes the 
corporate office’s support more expedient and makes support from other divisions easier 
through the corporate office's intervention. In sum. the unique system and activities o f 
the Korean government and corporate offices o f Korean business groups for exporting 
may lead to a positive relationship between centralized operating control and 
internationalization.
Corporate Control as Moderator. No statistical significance was found on the 
moderating effects o f operating control and financial control on the relationship between 
division risk-taking strategy and its financial performance. The results, however, showed
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that the interaction terms o f operating control and division risk-taking strategy had 
positive signs. In the tested regression model, the interaction term o f  operating control 
and R&D investment has b weight o f 1.448 at the/? = 0.119 level and the interaction o f 
operating control and internationalization has b weight o f 0.425 at the p  -  0.497 level (cfi. 
Table 4-16). The interaction effect o f operating control and R&D investment on 
performance was almost statistically significant at the/? = 0.10 level.
Although the interaction between centralized control and division risk-taking 
strategy was not statistically significant, these results suggest that centralization o f 
operational decision making influences positively the relationship between division risk- 
taking strategy and performance. In other words, decentralized operating control seems 
to provide no significant contribution to divisions in implementing R&D projects 
effectively. Because o f no prior empirical evidence regarding the effect o f  operating 
control on the relationship between risk-taking strategy and performance, the present 
study's speculation on these findings is limited. Future empirical research is needed for a 
better understanding o f the relationships between corporate control, division risk-taking 
strategy, and performance.
Theoretical Implications
The approaches and findings o f the present study provide some implications for 
theory building in strategic management. First, the prior studies on strategic management 
issues have primarily dealt with research questions from one level o f the organization: 
either at the corporate level or at the business unit level (Dess et al. 1995). The present
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study highlights the interaction between corporate and divisional levels. This study found 
that the core-business relatedness resulting from corporate-level strategy influences a 
division's risk-taking strategy and its performance. And it also found that the control 
system from the corporate office influences division risk-taking strategy. These findings 
demonstrated the importance o f interlevel studies focusing on the interconnections 
between the corporate and business levels.
Second, the research approach and the findings o f  this study have implications for 
research on the diversification-performance relationship. As noted previously, prior 
research on the relationship has not produced conclusive results despite a large amount o f 
study (Dess et al.. 1995; Ramanujam & Varadarajan. 1989). Researchers indicated two 
major potential reasons: industry effects and the unit o f analysis problem. Diversification 
strategy research mainly deals with one of the two research questions: "Does 
diversification create value?” and "Does one diversification strategy promise better 
performance than another diversification strategy?" (Ramanujam & Varadarajan. 1989) 
The research approach used in this study is related with the second question and shows 
how the question can be approached by adopting the divisional level as the unit of 
analysis. The approach showed how to control industry effects on performance by using 
industry-adjusted performance. This study demonstrated that the research design at the 
divisional level can be employed to understand the value o f corporate diversification 
strategy.
Third, this study has implications for the concept o f  relatedness. It introduced the 
concept o f core-business relatedness in studying the relationship between corporate
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diversification and division performance. Recently. Davis and his colleagues (1992) 
investigated the relationship between relatedness and performance at the business unit 
level. They focused on the perceived relatedness rather than on objective relatedness by 
using unit-level m anagers's responses to survey questions related to product and market 
similarity between their business units. Their study did not consider whether the 
similarity is formed centering around the core business o f the corporation. This study 
focused on the division's relatedness to core business(es) o f the corporation and also put 
emphasis on the interaction between the corporate office and divisions around the core 
business.
Fourth, the findings o f the present study have implications for agency theory. On 
the basis o f inconsistent findings, this study suggested that the agency problems that 
usually occur between a corporate office and divisions in the Western countries may not 
occur in Korean business groups. Two managerial characteristics of the Korean business 
group were suggested as possible reasons of such a low degree of agency problem: family 
participation in group and divisional management and the Yongo relationship at all levels 
of management. That is. U.S. firms, even with the danger o f creating agency problems, 
hire professional managers to achieve corporate objectives effectively and then initiate 
formal control systems to minimize agency problems, whereas Korean firms hire family 
managers or friends to control potential agency problems even at the risk o f 
organizational effectiveness. This suggests that potential contextual factors must be 
considered in testing agency arguments on the relationship between corporate offices and 
divisions.
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Managerial Implications
The results o f the present study have some implications for managers. First, this 
study suggests an answer to the question o f  how the corporate office diversifies to create 
value for its divisions. Core-business relatedness is the answer. This study found that 
divisions related to the core business o f the corporation outperform divisions not related 
to the core business. Core-business related divisions were found to be more committed to 
R&D investment than were unrelated divisions. Multibusiness companies consist of 
businesses which could exist independently. However, divisions can have the advantage 
of being under the umbrella o f a corporation in the form o f creating and sharing core 
competencies among related divisions and with the corporate office. Divisions which can 
not share core competence with other divisions fail to realize the benefit from a corporate 
office and/or sister divisions, even though they are under the umbrella o f  one corporation. 
Organizational collective learning and capabilities consisting o f competence lead to a 
division's attitude toward risk taking and in turn, competitive advantage in its individual 
market. In the process o f organizational learning, the corporate office plays the role of 
guardian and promoter o f the competence centering around its core business! es).
Second, the results of this study indicate that corporate control across divisions 
forms the context in which divisions make strategic decisions. This study found that 
corporate control affects a division's attitude toward risk taking strategy. It is a corporate 
office that sets the relationship between the corporate office and its divisions. This 
relationship represents internal decision making and control and forms the context of the 
division's strategic decision making. The corporate office can create value for its
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
131
divisions if it provides its divisions with corporate control encouraging the divisions to 
have a higher commitment to risk-taking strategies which are directly related to a 
division's competitive advantage. The corporate office will destroy value and waste 
resources if it provides its divisions with corporate control which discourages risk-taking.
Third, managers need to realize that corporate control systems which fail to 
consider context factors influencing the relationship o f a corporate office and divisions 
lead to unexpected outcome from the divisions. Agency theory suggests that centralized 
control from the corporate office is needed to prevent agency problems and risk-sharing 
problem stemming from a division's self-interest and opportunism. However, this study 
found that centralized control rather discouraged division R&D investment. It was 
speculated that the relationship between a corporate office and its divisions in Korean 
business groups may be influenced by unique managerial practices based on participation 
o f  family managers and connections between top managers. In countries wath a low 
possibility o f agency problems between a corporate office and its divisions, centralized 
control designed to prevent agency problem results in over controlling and fails to 
motivate agents to achieve goals expected by a principal. Especially when the corporate 
office adopts a centralized control system for its divisions unrelated to its core business 
the outcome can be disastrous. Thus, in designing corporate control across divisions, 
context factors which can influence the relationship between a corporate office and 
divisions must be considered.
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Limitations of the Study
The findings presented must be viewed in the context o f the major limitations o f 
the present study. First, this study used a small size o f  sample for testing the hypotheses. 
A study with larger samples would increase the generalizability o f the conceptual 
framework.
Second, this study employed a single respondent per company. Executives who 
are very knowledgeable about the managerial practices o f their business groups (Chief 
Planning Officer at the division) were used as key informants o f self reporting. Although 
the results o f  the reliability test showed sufficient support for the measurement, a study 
employing a multiple rater approach would increase the reliability and validity o f the 
measurement.
Third, this study relied on cross-sectional data. Associated relationships 
suggested in the research hypotheses involve causal relations between constructs. 
However, such data prevent the research from accurately testing the causal relationship 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. This is because there 
should be a time lag between strategic activities and performance outcome. By 
examining causal linkages in the longitudinal research design, it will be possible to better 
examine causal relationships suggested in this study.
Fourth, the present study was also limited in its use o f division performance 
measure. The logic behind using a Financial indicator, industry adjusted ROA. as division 
performance implies that effective implementation o f division risk-taking strategy would 
be reflected on this financial performance indicator. As Venkatraman and Ramanujam
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(1986) indicated, operational performance is another domain o f overall organizational 
performance. A similar study employing both indicators o f financial performance and 
operational performance (e.g.. ROA and innovation success, or ROA and market share) 
would provide more understanding of the relationships between corporate diversification, 
corporate control, division risk-taking strategy, and performance.
Suggestion for Future Research
The findings o f this study can suggest some important directions for future 
research. First, future research can use project-level data to examine the effect o f 
corporate strategy and control on division risk-taking strategies. Innovation projects and 
international market development projects will be good examples of division risk-taking 
strategies. These projects can also be studied by adopting the case study approach.
Using the case study method, theoretical arguments can be tested with the abundant data 
collected by several methods: archives, interviews, questionnaire, and observations 
(Eisenhardt. 1989).
Second, future studies need to develop an integrated model of corporate strategic 
decisions and their impact on division strategy and performance. The interdependent 
relationships found in this study suggest a direction o f  future studies in developing an 
integrated model. This study found that core-business relatedness influences division 
risk-taking strategy as well as division performance. This finding implies that corporate 
strategy influences division performance directly and indirectly through division risk- 
taking strategies. The relationship of core-business relatedness and division performance
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was significant after considering the effects o f corporate control and division risk-taking 
strategy on division performance (cf.. Table 4-15 and 4-16). These direct and indirect 
effects can be strictly tested in an integrated model. Furthermore, this study found that 
corporate control influences division risk-taking strategies. The effect was still 
significant after controlling for the influence o f  core-business relatedness ( c f . Table 4-6). 
It implies that corporate control should be considered in developing a causal model 
between corporate strategy, division risk-taking strategy, and division performance.
Third, future studies need to further explore how the relationship between a 
principal and an agent is influenced by context factors such as national culture, corporate 
culture, and informal information systems. Since agency theory focuses mainly on the 
relationship between humans, it is important to investigate potential context factors which 
can influence human relations. Future work should consider context factors when testing 
the effects o f control systems suggested by agency theory. Especially, future studies 
attempting to apply agency theoretical arguments internationally should consider the 
potential context factors influencing human relations. Along with these studies, the 
future efforts are needed to identify the context factors which can influence the agency 
relationship.
Conclusion
The present research explored the effects o f two major functions o f corporate 
strategic management, corporate diversification and corporate control, on the divisional 
management. This theme was organized into four specific research issues: (1) the effect
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o f core-business relatedness on division performance: (2) the relationship between core- 
business relatedness and corporate control: (3) the effect of core-business relatedness on 
the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and performance: and (4) the effect 
o f corporate control on the relationship between division risk-taking strategy and 
performance. Theoretical linkages for these issues were suggested from the following 
perspectives: the resource-based view, organizational learning, agency, contingency, and 
strategic management perspectives.
This research found that core-business relatedness influences division risk-taking 
strategy as well as division performance. It was also found that corporate control affects 
division risk-taking strategy. These results suggest that interactions between corporate- 
level strategic management and division-level strategic management influence division 
performance and ultimately, corporate performance. They show that strategic decisions 
at multiple levels o f the corporation are interconnected. The effective management o f the 
connected decisions would be an important source o f competitive advantage. On the 
basis o f the interconnections, a corporate office can create or destroy opportunities for its 
divisions to achieve competitive advantage. The importance o f connections found in this 
study implies that prior studies' findings on diversified companies at only one level of 
analysis need to be combined for better understanding of corporate and divisional 
strategic management. The potential connections can be inferred from the previous 
findings on strategic management factors such as strategic options, control systems, 
information systems, and others. Future efforts to build an integrated model o f strategic 
management factors across organizational levels would advance our understanding of
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organizational strategy and provide valuable implications for practitioners.
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24 Tongkook Trading j
25 Dongbu 2
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35 Oriental Chemical -»J
36 Tong Yang J
37 Pacific 4
38 Poongsan 1
39 Sung Shin Portland 1
40 Kum Kang
41 Sepoong 1
42 Taekwang Industries 1
43 Dae duck Industries 1
44 Jindo 1
45 Taihan Electric Wire 1
46 Shinwon 1
47 Kukdong Construction 1
48 Samhwan Enterprise 1
49 Samhwa Capacitor 2
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
156








R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
I Questions about Organizational Structure
1. Please indicate w hich  o f  the fo llow ing m ost c lo se ly  resem ble the basic organizational 
structure o f  your business group:
(a) Type I D iv isional Structure □
Group Planning Office
M e m b e r  Co m pa ny M e m b e r  C o m p a n y M e m b e r  C o m p a n y
M arketing Finance Production
(b) Type II D iv isional Structure □












(c) Other -- Please G iv e  Details □
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2. H ow  long has the organizational structure you indicated been in ex isten ce?
D  Less than a year 
Less than five years 
CD For more than five years
3. D oes your group have group-level planning o ffice  or its correspondent organization unit?
Y es Q  N o  Q
4. H ow  many member com panies d oes your group have? __________
II Questions about the Control Type of Your Group
5. W hich o f  the fo llow ing factors are used by the Group Planning O ffice  or its correspondent 
organization unit to evaluate the perform ance o f  your com pany ?
Please circle the appropriate response using the follow ing scale:
1 = Very important
2 = Important
3 = O f average importance
4 = Rarely used
5 = N ot a factor
j G ross Profit 1 2 J 4 5
1 Profit Growth 1 T nJ 4 5
I Return on Sales 1 2 J 4 5
• : 
i Return on Investment 1 J 4 5
| Sa les Growth 1 3 4 5
! M arket Share 1 2 j 4 5
j Cash Flow  1l :
*■> j 4 ! 5
i :
| Capital Investment Levels 1 2 •>j 4 ^
| C apacity Utilization 1 2 3 4 5
| Labor Productivity 1 2 3 4 1 5
j C ost levels 1i i
2 3 4 5
| Other — Please specify  1
! 1 
i......  — .......... ..... - ..... -jl
2
.........
J 4 1 5
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6. To what extent do the top m anagem ent team o f  your com pany have the authority to act on the 
problem s described b elow , w ithout group approval? (A ssum e business conditions are fairly 
good, and all d iv ision s are profitable.)
Please circle the appropriate response using the follow  ing scale:
1 =  The top m anagem ent team can take action without any contact w ith group office
2 = The top m anagem ent team takes action — informs group o ffice  later
3 = A dvise group o ffice  in advance o f  action the team intends to take
4 =  The top m anagem ent team has to obtain formal approval from group o ffice
before taking any action
S elect the replacem ent for the production manager 1 2  3 4
: w ho w ill retire soon
A uthorize 20%  increase in the com pany material 1 2  3 4
inventory, in anticipation o f  a possib le strike
Prom ote a manager to the position o f  executive at
periodical personnel changes___________________________________________________________________
Sw itch a m em ber o f  the top m anagem ent team (e.g.. a 1 2 3 4
execu tive director) from one position to another 
position at the equal level
Pass final approval on the design o f  a new product. 1 2  3 4
and authorize work to start on production tooling
Settle a minor dispute with union representative 1 2  3 4
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6. (continued)T o what extent do the top m anagem ent team  o f  your company have the authority  
to act on the problem s described below , without group approval?
Please circle the appropriate response using the fo llow  ing scale:
1 = The top m anagem ent team can take action without any contact with group office
2 = The top m anagem ent team takes action -- inform s group o ffice  later
3 = A dvise group o ff ic e  in advance o f  action the team intends to take
4 = The top m anagem ent team has to obtain formal approval from group office
before taking any action
Establish next m on th 's m anufacturing schedule for 1 
the d ivision, at an increased level which w ill require 
; the hiring o f  3% m ore people in the factory
j 4
Establish next m onth’s m anufacturing schedule at a 1 
substantially higher level w hich w ill require an 
addition o f  about 25%  m ore people in the factory
-> 3 4
Postpone the scheduled  introduction o f  a new  m odel 1 
and authorize a m odification  o f  the design
2 3 4
Re-establish the list price o f  a major product line 1 2 j 4
Increase the price o f  an ex istin g  product line by 5%. 1 
to attempt to recover cost increases in material and 
labor. This w ill p lace the price above the com petitive  
level.
-> j 4
M ake a change in the m em ber com pany inventory 1 
standards, w hich w ill reduce field shipping stocks but 
increase factory w ork-in-process inventory, 
m aintaining the sam e total investm ent
j 4
Increase investm ent in inventory on a main product. 1 
because the sales departm ent feels that they can get 
m ore sales i f  they have greater product availability
«*j 4
Introduce a new  production system  into the factory. 1 
that mav lead to a strike
j 4
Change the advertising program o f  the member 1 
com pany, reducing m agazine advertising but 
increasing TV and radio advertising
j 4
Authorize to increase the number o f  salesm en in the 1 
field , but reduce the num ber o f  manufacturing 
engineers to maintain the sam e total cost
3 4
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6. (continued)T o what extent do the top m anagem ent team o f  your com pany have the authority 
to act on the problem s described below, without group approval?
Please circle the appropriate response using the fo llow in g  scale:
1 = The top m anagem ent team can take action w ithout any contact with group o ffice
2 = The top m anagem ent team takes action — inform s group office  later
3 = A d vise  group o ffice  in advance o f  action the team intends to take
4 = The top m anagem ent team has to obtain form al approval from group o ffice
before taking any action
Authorize the factory to m odify  next m onth's 
m anufacturing schedule to reduce the backlog o f  
overdue orders
Cancel tw o engineering developm ent projects 1 2  3 4
Change the m em ber com pany's main supplier 1 2  3 4
Authorize an 1 billion w on 's R&D expense 1 2  3 4
Set the transfer price at which your com pany's 1 2  3 4
products are sold  to other member com panies w ithin  
the group
Select a replacem ent for old manufacturing facilities 1 2  3 4
Change a service system  in customer services area to 1 2 3 4
improve cost structure
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7. To what degree are the fo llow ing the responsibility o f  Group O ffices?  
Please indicate the degree o f  responsibility as follow s:
1 = A lw ays the responsibility o f  group o ffices
2 = N early a lw ays the responsibility o f  group o ffices
3 = A shared responsibility with the m em ber com pany
4 = Rarely the responsib ility  o f  group o ffices
5 = N ever the responsib ility  o f  group o ffices
Please circle the appropriate response
Peoriodical environm ent analysis (for analyzing  
threats and opportunities)
1 *> J 4 5
A nalyzing business com petitive position 1 ^ 4 5
Approval o f  m ajor business investment 1 ^ J 4 5
Long-term strategic planning I 3 4 5
Public relations(including relations with the 
governm ent)
I ^ j 4 5
Relations with financial institutions | 3 4 5
Legal functions 1 ^ j 4 5
Identifying acquisitions I “> *j 4 5
D eciding upon acquisitions 1 ^ ■'»j 4 N
Setting major expenditures 1 ^ ■■Ij 4 5
Setting strategic direction for the m em ber com pany I ■*»j 4 5
Analyzing product life cycle 1 ^ 4 5
Resetting industry portfolio 1 - ) 3 4 5
8. How long has the group's control type which you indicated in the above questions (Question
5. 6. and 7) been in existence?
D  Less than a year 
n  Less than five years 
□  For m ore than five  years
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III Questions about Strategic Behavior of Your Company
9. Organizational Strategic Behavior Information
1993 1994
R& D expenditure /
Total sales (%)
Export sales / Total 
sales (%)
IV Questions about Your Background Information
Your group name ______________________________________
Your com pany name __________________________________________________
Y our title _______________________________________
N um ber o f  Years you have been w ith the com pany ____________________
N um ber o f  Years you have been in the group ____________________
W ould you like a copy o f  the Summary o f  this study? Q  Y es Q  N o
Thank you for your tim e and cooperation.
1995
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